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Abstract 
Multiple agents have become increasingly utilized in various fields ~or both physical 
robots and software agents, such as search and rescue robots, automated driving, 
auctions and electronic commerce agents, and so on. In multiagent domains, agents 
interact and coadapt with other agents. Each agent's choice of policy depends on the 
others' joint policy to achieve the best available performance. During this process, 
the environment evolves and is no longer stationary, where each agent adapts to 
proceed towards its target. Each micro-level step in time may present a different 
learning problem which needs to be addressed. However, in this non-stationary 
environment, a holistic phenomenon forms along with the rational strategies of all 
players; we define this phenomenon as structural properties. 
In our research, we present the importance of analyzing the structural prop-
erties, and how to extract the structural properties in multiagent environments. 
According to the agents' objectives, a multiagent environment can be Classified as 
self-interested, cooperative, or competitive. We examine the structure from these 
three general multiagent environments: self-interested random graphical game play-
ing, distributed cooperative team playing, and competitive group survival. In each 
scenario, we analyze the structure in each environmental setting, and demonstrate 
the structure learned as a comprehensive representation: structure of players' ac-
tion influence, structure of constraints in teamwork communication, and structure 
of inter-connections among strategies. This structure represents macro-level knowl-
edge arising in a multiagent system, and provides critical, holistic information for 
each problem domain. Last, we present some open issues and point toward future 
research. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
What are the differences between single agent learning versus multiagent learning? 
Single agent learning is a process where one single agent improves its performance 
through its own experience; whereas, multi-agent learning describes a process where 
multiple agents perform in the same environment, and each agent learns along with 
o~her agents to achieve each individual's agenda. Mature research exists in sin-
gle agent learning, such as supervised learning (regression modelling and classifica-
tion), unsupervised learning (clustering), and reinforcement learning (learning from 
'rewards given). In contrast, multiagent learni~g, a relatively new field, mostly ex-
tends from a single agent reinforcement learning perspective, and the goal is to learn 
how to perform and achieve the highest rewards under coordination/ constraints of 
other agents who perform jointly and simultaneously. Another branch of multia-
gent learning research, influenced by game theorists, focuses on strategy selection, 
which studies how multiple players play in a game and choose best strategies to 
achieve their goals. Strategy selection is a critical process to analyze the best strat-
egy, for example, the minmax-Q (Littman, 1994) strategy describes a process which 
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is to choose the maximum payoff in the worst/minimum situation. The purpose 
of analyzing this difference is to examine what the important breakthrough is in 
both communities, and what may be missing in addressing/solving some bottleneck 
problems. 
1.1 Rationale 
Multiple agents become increasingly important in various applications for both phys-
ical robots and software agents, such as, robot soccer, search and rescue robots, au-
tomated driving, auctions and electronic commerce agents, and so on. The merits 
of game theory influence computer science researchers in non-human-player game 
playing. An agent, a non-human player, observes the environment and chooses an 
action to perform. Commonly, agents have goals, assumptions, algorithms for learn-
ing and reasoning, and conventions. Learning through single agent tasks has been 
studied extensively in the reinforcement learning field, in which an agent acts alone 
in a stationary environment. In multiagent domains, agents interact with others, 
and co-adapt with others, then act on the best choice available. Since all the agents 
are evolving, the environment is no longer stationary, and this dynamic brings in 
a difficult learning problem that violates the basic stationary assumption of tradi-
tional techniques for behaviour learning. Each agent's choice of policy depends on 
the others' joint policy, which also aims to achieve the best available performance. 
Our work focuses on understanding the dynamics in a multigent system, in order 
to improve the strategic decision-making and learning process of agent behaviours, 
whose target is to select the best strategies, and adapt to unforeseen difficulties and 
changes in the environment. 
2 
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1.2 Objective 
An agent can learn through experience from its own actions and associated effects, 
while l~arning from observation of other agents' experience. Note that an agent 
should effectively associate similar patterns and build knowledge: instead of merely 
keeping a record of the reward history for all agents. By using this knowledge, the 
agent 'Can efficiently explore the strategy space. Exploration vs. exploitation is a 
critical choice in the agent learning process. 
A complex non-stationary environment provides a dynamic learning domain. 
This domain is composed of other agents' diverse states. Thus, the complexity of 
the domain grows with the increase of the number of agents. Our intention is to 
seek an answer to the following questions: 
How can an agent perform robustly in the various types of multiagent 
environment, so that each agent can efficiently observe other agents be-
haviours: and learn from its observation in order to act (or adapt) effec-
tively in the complex non-stationary environment? What is the macro-
level phenomenon of the whole system, and how can this understanding 
of phenomenon improve individual performance? 
Ultimately, through a learning period and a series of actions, agents can achieve 
top-ranked performance. 
In traditional machine learning, the single agent learning process is designed to 
achieve one determined goal through exploration, with or without supervision. A 
rational decision improves performance at each step. However, when a single agent 
explores in a multiagent environment, a new dynamic occurs wherein every agent 
in this environment acts to optimize its own rewards at the state-of-art priority (in-
3 
f I 
terest). Therefore, there may exist a current temporary goal arising in the situation 
which may not lie in the same direction of a simple agent's objective learning curve. 
Further:more, unknown factors in the environment add another level of difficulty to 
an agent who tries to maximize its performance. Assuming each agent is rational, we 
can model other agents' behaviours and predict their behaviours with sufficient con-
fidence. However, if the assumption of rationality does not hold, this problem can 
be seen as a new problem where the original model with a certain objective function 
does not hold; thus, a new dynamic model is required to tackle this problem. 
In addition to this dynamic occurrence arising in multiagent learning, another 
critical issue is how an agent balances between exploration and exploitation in the 
environment. The objective of exploration is to obtain maximum information about 
the environment; however, exploitation, as a result of exploration, is the ultimate 
required action. Thus, we include both these factors in the objective function which 
measures the satisfactory of agents' performance. While performing, this learning 
system is a closed system within a certain limited time; if it fails to reach satisfac-
. tory performance, the system changes to open stage and modifies required learning 
parameters. This whole process repeats in a cycle, and the learning process is for-
mulated continuously. 
1.3 Contributions 
We provide the following contributions to the literature: 1) present the importance 
of analyzing the structural properties in multiagent problems; 2) provide a novel 
structure learning algorithm (MDRLSA) to learn a compact representation in ran-
dom graphical games; 3) introduce an adaptive teamwork algorithm (SE-adaptive) 
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for cooperative agents who choose an optimal level of teamwork in varying density of 
constraint structures; and 4) present a competitive multiagent simulation platform 
(ALGAE), and learn a Bayesian Network structure representation that is revealed 
among agents' strategies. 
In one aspect, multiagent learning research focuses on learning from individual 
agent's past experience or modeling other agents' behaviors to improve performance. 
In the other aspect, research on multiagent systems addresses particular problems 
from a system perspective, with more focus on a number of agents' interactions, and 
provides optimal solutions. However, in a non-stationary multiagent environment, 
each agent adapts to proceed towards its target. Each micro-level step in time 
may present a different learning problem which needs to be addressed. In this 
non-stationary environment, a holistic phenomenon forms along with the rational 
strategies of all players; we define this phenomenon as structural properties. In 
this dissertation, we present how to extract the structural properties in multiagent 
problems. 
A multiagent environment can be classified as self-interested, cooperative, or 
competitive according to agents' goal. Here, a self-interested environment differs 
from a competitive, where all agents are not competing with others as a general-
sum game as in a competitive environment. Thus, we examine the structure from 
these three general multiagent environments: self-interested random graphical game 
playing, distributed cooperative team playing, and competitive group competition. 
In each scenario, we analyze the structure in each environmental setting and demon-
strate a structure learned as a comprehensive representation: structure of players' 
action influence, structure of constraints in teamwork communication, and structure 
of inter-connections among strategies. This structure represents macro-level knowl-
5 
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edge arising in a multiagent system, and provides critical, holistic information for 
each problem domain. 
1.4 Outline 
In the following chapters, we first review the related work in multiagent learning, 
framework and systems. Then, before we present our perspective on how to tackle 
multiagent systems, we analyze the characteristics of various scales of a multiagent 
learning problem from a holistic perspective. 
After revealing the important characteristics which exist among multiple player 
games 'in Chapter :3, we further explore the structural connection of mutual influence 
between players' action choices in game-playing in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we 
explore team-playing games, how structure matters to achieve the best exploration 
strategy in various network connections, in order to balance the time consumption 
and overall payoff. In Chapter G, we present a simulation of multiagent systems in 
a competitive environment, artificial life, where we analyze what we can learn from 
survivors' fitness through a graphical representation: Bayesian Networks. In our 
last chapter, we present some open issues and point toward future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Background: Multiagent 
Learning, Framework and 
Systems 
A multiagent system (MAS) (Stone and Veloso, 2000; Wooldridge, 2008; Shoha.m 
and Leyton-Brown, 2009) has a broad set of definitions; each definition leads to 
different constraints to solve MAS tasks. The goal of machine learning is to build 
intelligent programs which can solve problems after a learning and evolving process. 
This intelligent program is often called an "agent". 
An agent is a computational application that is designed to automate certain 
tasks with a guiding intelligence, to achieve a result. A multiagent environment 
is one in which more than one agent acts while agents interact with one another 
to perform tasks. Moreover, agents may or may not know everything about the 
environment. An agent learns by interacting in its environment and by observing 
7 
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the effect of these interactions. This learning, while performing in the environment, 
is the key to accumulating experience and forming knowledge through performance. 
2.1 General Multiagent Learning Approaches 
Multiagent learning (MAL) (Shoham et a.I., 2007; Stone and Veloso, 2000; Panait 
and Luke, 2005) has a long history in the game theory field, as well as in the machine 
learning community. In MAL, agents are given feedback about their behaviors as re-
wards or penalties in a given situation. Thus, reward-based methods are widely used 
in this field, including two major streams: reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and 
Barto, 1998) which estimates value functions, and evolutionary computation (EC) 
which directly learn behaviors using stochastic search methods. The similarities 
and differences between these two classes of learning methodology have generated 
a rich literature, and some address both classes, such as the bucket-brigade algo-
rithm (Holland, 1985), the Samuel system (Grefenstette et al., 1990), and the recent 
Stochastic Direct Reinforcement policy gradient algorithm (Moody et al., 2004). 
Evolutionary Computation is a family of mechanisms inspired by biological evo-
lution such as reproduction, mutation, recombination, natural selection and survival 
of the fittest. Candidate solutions to the given problem play the role of individuals 
in a population, and the cost function (also calls "fitness function") determines the 
environment within which the solutions "live". Then evolution of the population 
takes place .to select and continue to refine the population until time is exhausted, 
or an optimal solution is discovered. 
Coevolutionary algorithms (CEAs) naturally apply evolutionary computation 
to refine multi-agent behaviors. In a CEA, the fitness of an individual is both 
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subjective and context-sensitive, based on its iteration with other individuals in the 
population. In competitive coevolution, individuals benefit at the expense of their 
components, but in cooperative coevolution (CCE), individuals succeed and fail 
together in collaboration. Generally, cooperative coevolution algorithms (CCEAs) 
solve a problem starting by decomposing the problem, and then assigning each 
subcomponent to a separate population of individuals (Potter and De .Jong, 2000). 
Before we get into the learning process for multiple agents, we first examine how 
a single agent learns and evolves in an environment. 
2.2 Single Agent Learning 
One interesting problem arising along with this agent reinforcement learning process 
is the trade-off between exploration and exploitation (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Once 
an agent learns a certain action which has performed well, should an agent exploit 
this action since it is known to receive a decent reward? Or should the agent 
explore other possibilities in order to seek a better reward? Obviously, exploring is 
definitely a good tactic sometimes, but without a balance between exploration and 
exploitation, agents will not learn successfully. The common way to achieve a good 
balance is to try a variety of actions while progressively favoring those producing the 
most reward. In this section, we examine the most influential work in RL: temporal 
difference learning and Q-learning. 
2.2.1 Markov Decision Process 
An agent learning process can be separated into the following steps: 
9 
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• Observe the surrounding environment; 
• Decide an action (or "strategy") according to certain criteria; 
• Perform the action; 
• Agent receives feedback, rewards or penalty, from the environment; 
• Information about experience is recorded. In detail, the experience includes 
the environment situation, the action chosen, and the feedback received. 
Eventually, an agent can learn an optimal decision policy which performs the best 
in a certain environment, by performing actions and evaluating the results related. 
Markov decision processes are the foundation for research in single agent learning. 
A Markov decision process (MDP) (Sutton and Barto, 1998;Belhnan, 19.57) is a 
4-tuple, (S, A, T, R), where, 
• S is the finite set of the states; 
• A is the finite set of actions; 
• T : S x A x S --+ [O, 1] is a transition function, which defines a probability 
distribution over next states as a function of the current state and the agent's 
action: 
Vs E S,Va EA, LT(s,a,s') = 1; 
s'ES 
• R : S x A--+ IR is a reward function, which defines the reward received when 
selecting an action from the given state. 
At time t, the agent receives the reward rt= R(st, at), and the agent observes 
a new state st+1 , which is drawn from the probability distribution specified by 
10 
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In general, the transition function T and the reward function R are not known 
in advance. Thus, the goal of a learning agent in an MDP is to learn a policy 7r 
to maximize its long-term reward R based on the only samples received. A policy 
7r is defined to map the probability of selecting an action from a particular state. 
Formally, 7r E S x A---+ [O, 1], where Vs E S, l:aEA 7r(s, a) = 1. 
Two common ways to formulate the long-term reward are the discounted reward 
function and the average reward function. Define V1r(s) as a policy's state value 
function, and E(rt I s0 = s, 7r) as the expected reward received at time t given the 
initial state s and the agent follows the policy 7r. The average reward is formed as: 
T 1 
V1r(s) = lim 2:-TE(rt I s0 = s, 7r), 
T-too 
t=O 
(2.1) 
which is under a common assumption that the MDP is a unichain. The unichain 
assumption is that the Markov chain induced by every stationary policy (perhaps 
randomized) has only one ergodic class of states and, perhaps, some transient states.1 
The discounted reward is described as follows: 
00 
V1r(s) = L "lE(rt I s0 = s,7r),1' E [O, 1). (2.2) 
t=O 
1' is a discount factor, which accumulates the immediate reward with probability 1' 
instead of a larger future utility. Temporal difference learning describes a class of 
algorithms that adopt this discounted reward formulation. 
1 An MDP is unichain if and only if, for all policies, there exists an ergodic set of states (i.e., 
any state in the set can be reached with non-zero probability from any other state in the set), and 
a.ll states outside this set a.re tra.nsient (i.e., after some finite point in time it will never be visited 
again). 
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The Markov decision process is under the Markov assumption, which generally, 
requires that the next state and reward to the agent depend only on the current 
state and agent's action. Formally, we state this property of MDP as follows. 
Definition 1 A decision process is Markovian if and only if, the sequence of states 
{st E, S ), actions (at E A), and the rewards {rf ER}, satisfies 
P { t t I t-1 t-1 o o} p { t t I t-1 t-1} r s = s, ri = ri s , a , ... , s , a = r s = s, ri = ri s , a . 
An agent's selection of actions is Markovian if and only if, 
that is, only if the agent's next action depends only on the current state.2 
We also refer to a Markovian process as stationary, and in the multiagent frame-
work of stochastic games, this property does not hold in a non-stationary environ-
ment. 
2. 2. 2 Q-learning 
Q-learning is the most significant breakthrough as an off-policy Temporal Difference 
(TD) control algorithm. The simplest, one-step Q-learning is defined as follows: 
2Definition l, 2, :3, .J, [), 6, are adopted from the formulation presented in Bowling, 2003, and 
Definition l, G are based on Sutton and Barto, 1998, Bellman, 1.%7. 
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where a is the learning rate, 0 < a < 1; when a is set to 0, it means that the 
Q-value is never updated and nothing is learnt; while a is set to 0.9, it means that 
learning can occur quickly. Q (st, at) is the expected value of performing action a 
in state s; and maxa Q(s, a) is the maximum reward received and then follows the 
optimal policy. The Q-learning algorithm is shown in Algorithm L 
Algorithm 1: Q-learning: An off-policy TD control algorithm 
Initialize Q(s, a) arbitrarily; 
repeat for each episode: 
Initialize s; 
repeat for each step of episode: 
Choose a from s using policy derived from Q; 
Take action a, observe r, s'; 
Q(s, a) +-- Q(s, a)+ a[r + / maxa' Q(s', a') - Q(s, a)]; 
s +-- s'; 
until s is terminal; 
until; 
Take a discrete, grid game, "cat-mouse-cheese", as an example. The traditional 
rules of the Cat and Mouse game are: 
a. Both the cat and mouse have 8 degrees of movement. Up, down, left and right, 
as well as the four diagonals. 
b. The mouse scores reward r ch for getting the cheese. The mouse gets the cheese 
when it is in the same square as the cheese. 
c. The mouse gets punishment r c for being caught by a cat, by simply both being 
in the same square. 
13 
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d. If the mouse gets the cheese, a new piece is placed randomly while the cat and 
mouse keep their positions. 
e. The game is over when the cat catches the mouse. The scores are then updated 
and a new game can begin. 
Jn,this general cat and mouse game, the mouse, as the intelligent agent, performs 
while: learning in a n x n grid; on the other hand, cat is not a learning agent. In 
each 'learning episode, the mouse/ cat action space is a E [ 0, 7), 11a11 = 8; while the 
observation space is the cat's grid position [ex, cy] and the mouse's grid position 
[mx, my] and if the mouse is in hole: flag. The performance measure for this game 
is the cumulative reward for the mouse. Using the off-policy Q-learning algorithm, 
the mouse can be trained to learn strategies to gain optimal cumulative reward in 
this n x n grid environment. However, when the cat is also a learning agent, can 
this mouse continue to survive with optimal performance using the same strategies? 
The answer is probably no. This scenerio leads to a different issue: a multiagent 
learning problem. 
In the next section, we present a general framework for multi-agent learning. 
2.3 General Framework of MAL 
In a multiagent learning framework, multiple agents process three different cate-
gories of activities: perception, reasoning and action (see Figure 2.1). First, each 
agent observes other agents and collect information in the environment, called "per-
ception". Second, agents conduct reasoning according to their own preferences and 
14 
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knowledge to decide an optimal strategy; thereafter, agents perform their actions 
and receive feedback respectively. 
Environment} . {:} /I Agent I 
+------.. 
t t 
I {}-- - -{} 
Figure 2.1: Multiagent Framework 
Stochastic games are defined as multiple agents with a multiple states frame-
work, which can be viewed as a synthesis of Markov decision processes and matrix 
games. MDPs model a single agent, multiple states model, which have been explored 
prominently in the field of reinforcement learning (see Section 2.2.1 ). On the other 
hand, matrix games describe a multiagent system with single state model, which are 
the foundational concepts in the game theory field. Since stochastic games share 
concepts with these two simpler frameworks, it is useful to consider them indepen-
dently to analyze the core concepts while addressing the critical issues existing in 
stochastic games only. Figure 2.2 illustrates the relations among these three con-
cepts. In Section 2.2, we discuss MDP as a single agent reinforcement learning; 
then, we examine matrix games, a multiagent, single-state learning process. 
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Figure 2.2: Stochastic Games include MDPs and Matrix Games 
2.3'.1 Matrix Games 
Matrix games were first examined in the field of game theory to model strategic 
interactions of many decision makers (von Neumann and I\.forgenstern, 1944; Os-
borne and Rubinstein, 1994). Mathematically, a matrix game (or strategic game) is 
a tuple (A, R), where A= Ai x · · · x An is the action space for each player; player i 
chooses an action Ai, and receives the payoff Ri, i E [1, n], which depends on all the 
players' act~ons. R is normally written as n-dimensional matrices, and each entry 
in the reward matrices corresponds to the joint actions taken. The learning process 
in matrix games means that agents repeatedly play the same matrix game, which is 
also called a repeated game. Agents learn through experience from observation of 
other agents' behaviors and their rewards, to maximize its own reward. 
Examples 
As follows, we list several matrix games and the payoff function matrices. Note that 
R1 is the payoff matrix for player 1 and R2 is for player 2. In each game matrix, 
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the row represents player 1, and the column represents player 2. 
• (a) Rock-Paper-Scissors 
Two players with each having three options: "Rock", "Paper" and "Scissors", 
and the rules are: "Rock" loses to "Paper", "Paper" loses to "Scissors", and 
"Scissors" loses to "Rock"; otherwise, it is a tie. The winner gains one dollar 
from the loser, while the loser loses one dollar. For example, player 1 plays P 
while player 2 plays S, and the reward is -1 for player 1 and 1 for player 2. 
R p s R p s 
R 0 -1 1 R 0 1 -1 
Ri= , R2 = 
p 1 0 -1 p -1 0 1 
s -1 1 0 s 1 -1 0 
• (b) Coordination Game 
Two players simply both desire to agree on their action choice, but with no 
preferences between them. 
A B A B 
Ri = A 1 0 , R2 = A 1 O 
B 0 1 B 0 1 
• ( c) Stackelberg Stage Game 
The players of this game are a leader and a follower and they compete on re-
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ward quantity; the leader moves first and then the follower moves sequentially. 
Up 
Down 
Left Right 
1 3 
2 4 
Up 
Down 
Left Right 
0 2 
1 0 
Matrix games can be classified according to their payoff function. If one agent's 
gain is other agents' loss, we call this type of game as general-sum games. For 
example game (a), the sum of player l's gain and player 2's loss equals zero, we also 
call this zero-sum game. Another common type of matrix game is team game, i.e., 
game (b), in which all agents have the same payoff function. In other words, one 
agent's best interest is the best interest of all others. Game (c) looks similar to the 
general-sum game and team game, but it is neither of them. 
What we can learn in game ( c) is as follows: imagine a repeated version of this 
game, and assume that the column player (secondary player: follower) is paying 
attention to the row player's (first player: leader) strategy and the rewards after 
each move. The two players will end up in a repeated (Down, Left) play and (Up, 
Right) play, since this is a way that benefits both. We conclude from this example: 
that learning and teaching happens at the same time: the row player has taught the 
column player to play in a way that benefits both most. Or, we can see this as an 
adaptation rather than a learning process. Note that the concept of strategy is not 
the same as a move. A move refers to an action taken by a player at the certain 
point during the game; while a strategy means a complete algorithm for playing the 
game which then tells a player what to do throughout the game. 
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Nevertheless, the learning agent's goal is to learn a strategy that maximizes its 
reward, using either pure strategies or mixed strategies. A pure strategy provides a 
complete set of how a player plays a game; while a mixed strategy is a probability of 
each pure strategy. An arbitrary finite matrix game may not have a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium, but it always has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951). 
Therefore, in our research, we focus on mixed strategies, and the definition is given 
as below. 
A mixed strategy refers to a joint strategy a for all n players. One player i's 
strategy ai, specifies a probability distribution over all actions A, and its reward 
function Ri is defined over mixed strategy as follows: 
Ri(a) = L Ri(a)IIf=1 ai(a). (2.4) 
aEA 
Ri(a) is the reward received by player i whe!-1 playing action a, and ai(a) is the 
probability distribution of playing action a. 
In matrix games, one player's optimal strategy can only be evaluated if the 
other players' strategies are known. So, this is an opponent-dependent solution, 
also called best-response. We use < ai, a_i > to represent the joint strategy where 
player i follows ai while others follow a-i· a_i refers to a joint strategy for all the 
players except player i. 
Definition 2 For a matrix game, the best-response function for player i, B ~ (a -i), 
is the set of all strategies that are optimal given the other player{s) play the joint 
strategy a-i· Formally, ai E BRi(a-i), if and only if, 
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where P D(Ai) is the set of all probability distributions over the set Ai {the set of all 
mixed strategies for player i).:{ 
One most critical notion in matrix game and game theory is a best-response 
equilibrium, also called Nash Equilibrium (Nash, 1950). 
Definition 3 For a matrix game, a Nash equilibrium is a collection of strategies 
for all players, CYi, with 
The ref ore, no player can do better by changing strategies given that the other players 
continue to follow the equilibrium strategy. 
All matrix games have a Nash equilibrium, and there may be more than one. In 
zero-sum games, one appealing feature is that there is a unique Nash equilibrium, 
and this equilibrium corresponds to the games' minmax solution. In other words, 
this mixed strategy maximizes the worst-case expected reward. This solution can 
be found in a linear program as illustrated in Eq. 2.5. 
Maximize: mina2 EA2 LaiEAi cr(a1)R( < ai, a2 > ), (2.5) 
Subject to: LaiEAi cr(a1) = 1, 
cr(a1) ~ 0, Va1 E Ai. 
This solution is player 1 's equilibrium strategy, where this linear program has 
llA1 II parameters. Player 2's strategy can be solved similarly. In Rock-Paper-Scissors 
game, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which each player selects their actions 
3 Definitions 2, ;>,, 4., 5 are based on Na.sh, 1950. 
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with equal probability 1/3 (as mixed strategy Nash equilibrium). But, if one player 
simply adopts this equilibrium strategy, will the player win the competition of a 
tournament? The answer is no, because a Nash equilibrium provides a rational 
strategy, not necessary a best benefit one. Furthermore, in a general matrix game, 
finding a Nash equilibrium is known to be NP-hard, yet is still an open question 
(Gilboa and Zemel, 1988; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2008). 
2.3.2 Stochastic Games 
Stochastic games are an extension of a combination of matrix games and MDPs, 
which include multiple agents with multiple stages. Formally, a stochastic game 
(Shapley, 195:3) can be represented as a tuple: (n, S, A, T, R), where: 
• n is the number of agents; 
• S is a set of stages; 
• A is a set of actions, A = Ai,··· , An; Ai is player i's action. (We assume 
that each player has the same strategy space in all games. This is a notational 
convenience, not a substantive restriction.) 
• Tis a transition function specifying the probability of the next stage game to 
be played based on the game just played and the action taken in it: S x Ax S ---+ 
[O, 1], such that, 
Vs ES, Va EA, L T(s, a, s') = 1. 
s'ES 
• R is the reward function, R = Ri, · · · , Rn. ~ is the immediate reward func-
tion of player i for at the stage S: S x A ---+ R. Note that each player has its 
own independent reward function. 
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When n = 1, stochastic games are MDPs; when llSll = 1, they are matrix games 
or repeated games. The goal for player i in a stochastic game is to learn a policy 
that maximizes long-term reward, same as for MDPs. A policy for player i, 'Tri is a 
mapping that defines the probability of selecting an action from a particular stage. 
Formally, 'Tri E S x A ---+ [O, 1], where 
Vs ES, L 1ri(s, a) = l. 
aEA 
We use 7r to refer to a joint policy for all the players, and Ili refers to the set of all 
possible stochastic policies available to player i, while II = II1 x · · · x IIn refers to 
the set of joint policies for all the players. 7r _i refer to a particular joint policy of all 
the players except player i, and II_i refers to the set of such joint policies. Finally, 
the notion <'Tri, 7r_i > refers to the joint policy where player i follows 'Tri while the 
other players follow their policy from 7r -i. 
Next, similar to MDPs, we need to define how to aggregate the set of the imme-
diate rewards received in each stage for each agent in order to quantify the value of 
a policy. For finitely repeated games: we can simply use the sum or average reward 
which is the typical approach. For infinitely repeated games, the most common ap-
proaches are to use either the limit average or the sum of discounted rewards. The 
limit average reward function V of player i in stochastic games is defined similarly 
to MDPs, as follows, 
T 1 
Vt(s) = lim L -TE(r! I s0 = s, 7r), 
T-too t=O 
(2.6) 
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where E(rf I s0 = s, 7r) as the expected reward to player i received at time t given the 
initial state s and the agents follow the policy 7r. Similarly, the sum of discounted 
award function is defined with discount factor/,/ E [O, 1), as, 
00 
V/"(s) = L /t E(rf I s0 = s, 7r). (2.7) 
t=O 
Notice that this reward function for each agent i is dependent on the joint policy 
of the other agents. As in MDPs, we can also define Q-values for a given agent for 
a particular joint policy. For the discounted reward framework, Q-values can be 
formulated as, 
Qi(s, a)= Ri(s, a)+/ L '!'(s, a, s')V/"(s'). 
s'ES 
On the other hand, similar to matrix games, there is a best-response in stochastic 
games. Notice that a policy for a player can only be evaluated in the context of all 
the players' policies. 
Definition 4 For a stochastic game, the best-response function for player i, BRi( 7T"-i), 
is the set of all policies that are optimal given the other player{s) play the joint policy 
7r-i· Formally, 7ri E B~(7r-i), if and only if, 
where P D(Ai) is the set of all probability distributions over the set Ai {the set of all 
mixed strategies for player i). 
We can also define the most critical notion: a best-response equilibrium or Nash 
Equilibrium, similar to matrix games in game theory. 
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Definition 5 For a stochastic game, a Nash equilibrium is a collection of policies, 
one for each player, 1fi, such that, 
The ref ore, no player can do better by changing policies given that the other players 
continue to follow the equilibrium policy. 
Stochastic games can be classified the same way as matrix games. Team games 
are the ones where all the agents receive the same reward function. General-sum 
games are the ones where one player's gain means other players' loss. Zero-sum 
games refer to the sum of total rewards equals to zero. Like matrix games, zero-sum 
stochastic games have a unique Nash equilibrium. 
In stochastic games, the Markov assumption still holds, but it has a different 
form, given in Definition G. 
Definition 6 A multiagent decision problem is Markovian if and only if, the se-
quence of states (st E S ), actions (at E A), and the rewards (rf E R), satisfies 
P { t t I t-1 t-1 o o} P { t t I t-1 t-1} r s = s, ri = ri s , a , ... , s , a = r s = s, ri = ri s , a . 
That is, if the next state and rewards depend only on the previous state and all of 
the agents' actions, but not on the history of states and actions. 
From the game's perspective, stochastic games are Markovian, but from a single 
agent's perspective, the process is no longer stationary or Markovian (versus "be-
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havior strategy" 4 ). It is because the transition probabilities associated with a single 
agent's action from a state are not stationary and change over time as the other 
agents' action choices change. This property is critical to single-agent reinforcement 
learning research, and this violation of basic assumptions require new techniques to 
be developed to learn effective policies in stochastic games. 
2.4 Multiagent Systems and Related Work 
In the evolutionary computing community, multiagent learning research focuses on 
refining multiagent behaviours through each generation by assessing the fitness of 
the individual. In competitive coevolution, individuals benefit at the expense of their 
opponent; in cooperative coevolution, individuals succeed or fail together while in 
collaboration. This process refines the population until the sufficient level of fitness 
for individuals is discovered. As team learning goes, both the homogeneous (Haynes 
and Sen, 1996b; Haynes et al., 1995a; Haynes et al., 1995b) and heterogeneous forms 
(Luke and Spector, 1996; Andre and Teller, 1999; Haynes and Sen, 1996a; Haynes 
and Sen, 1997a.; Haynes and Sen, 1997b; Potter et al., 2001) are promoted, from 
the perspective of allowance of different roles or behaviours for each a.gent in the 
group who has successful achievement. However, in this setting, one critical feature 
in multiagent learning has not been achieved: where a single agent's individual 
learning process has not been addressed to solve the issues arising when emergent, 
unforeseen changes occur. 
This dynamic feature in a multiagent setting has been addressed in reinforce-
ment learning communities. In the MAL literature, the RL community extends 
4 A behavior strategy is defined if 7rt = f(ht) where ht is the history up to time t; a makovian 
or stationary strategy is a special case of behavior strategy when ht = </>. 
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Bellman-style single-agent reinforcement learning techniques to a multiagent set-
ting, in particular Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992), which learns the utility 
of performing actions in states for controlling and prediction purposes. This tech-
nique has performed well in: a) zero-sum repeated games (Littman, 1994; Littman 
and Szepesvari, 1996), b) common-pay-off (or "team") repeated games (Claus and 
Boutilier, 1998; Kapetanakis and Kudenko, 2004; Wang a.nd Sandholm, 2002), but 
not :so well in c) general-sum stochastic games (Hu a.nd \Vellman, 1998; Littman, 
200'1; Greenwald and Hall, 2003). 
In multiagent reinforcement learning settings, research takes on stochastic games 
and focuses on individuals who learn simultaneously and converge to optimal results 
(Bowling, 2005; Claus and Boutilier, 1998; Hu and Wellrnan, 2003). The important 
research of GIGA-WOLF (Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent - Win or Learn 
Fast) proves the no-regret and convergence criteria theoretically and experimentally 
in general-sum games. In general, optimal payoff is the common interest for the 
multiagent learning process. (Here, optimal payoff refers to no-regret.) 
Nevertheless, scalability with the number of agents is ~critical problem for mul-
tiagent learning. Multiagent learning involves multiple agents' behaviours in order 
to solve a common task, thus the search space can grow exponentially according to 
the number of agents and the complexity of agent behaviour. The evaluation criteria 
for learning methods should be standardized with respect to their scalability. In a 
general-sum learning process, especially with partially observed stochastic games, 
research usually involves studies in two-agent scenarios, with two or three actions 
for each agent. When scaled up to include more agents, current methods are un-
likely to work in practice. In cooperative multiagent systems, to optimize a global 
objective has been addressed as the Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems 
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(DCOPs) with promising results. Research on finding globally optimal DCOP algo-
rithms has been provided, such as ADOPT (Asynchronous Distributed Constraint 
Optimization) where it proves that DCOPs are NP-hard (Modi et al., 2005). Thus, 
when the number of agents increases, regarding both computational and communi-
cation requirement, the scalability needs to be improved. Furthermore, modelling 
the uncertainty in the multiagent systems, rich model such as Decentralized Partially 
Observable MDPs (DEC-POMDPs) gives promising results but mostly limits their 
applications with two or three agents (Bernstein et al., 2000). Velagapudi et al. have 
scaled DEC-POMDPs with hundreds of agents by given coordination locals (CLs) 
as heuristic information (Velagapudi et al., 2011). Interactive POMDP (IPOMDP) 
(Gmytra.siewicz a.nd Doshi, 2005; Rossi, 201a) can explicitly model and predict the 
other agents intention (i.e., mixed strategy) under partial observability. However, 
both DEC-POMDPs and DCOPs assume that agents act in a static environment, 
and solving IPOMDP is prohibitively expensive due to computational difficulties 
that policy space grows exponentially with the length of planning horizon, where 
dynamic factors havenot been encountered and modeled. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we described the single agent learning process and examine most 
critical techniques Q-learning in the reinforcement learning field. Thereafter, we in-
troduce MDPs and matrix games, since stochastic games can be seen as a merging 
of both. Through detailed analysis of MDPs and matrix games, we present the gen-
eral framework for multiagent learning, and some important concepts in stochastic 
games and in game theory. Last, we examine multiagent systems and related work. 
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In the next chapter, we analyze the structure characteristics and the dynamics in 
large scale multiagent systems. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Multiagent research derives from two perspectives: learning and systems. In one 
aspect, multiagent learning research focuses on learning from individual agent's past 
experience or modeling other agents' behaviors to improve performance. In the other 
aspect, research on multiagent system addresses particular problems from a system 
perspective, with more focus on a number of agents' interactions, and provides 
optimal solutions. However, in a non-stationary multiagent environment, each agent 
adapts to proceed towards its target. Each micro-level step in time may present a 
different learning problem which needs to be addressed. In this chapter, we present 
our research methodology on how to solve multiagent problems, and illustrate the 
common characteristics and dynamics in large scale multiagent systems. 
3.1 Research Methodology and Framework 
We propose a novel multiagent environmental description, and a system process to 
describe the interaction among agents. This design differs from the description in 
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Chapter 2, this new unified framework includes more functional features for each 
agent to perform adaptively in dynamic environment with guidance from macro-
level influence of structures, as well as micro-level individual learning and modeling. 
In this non-stationary environment, a holistic phenomenon forms along with the ra-
tional strategies of all players; we define this phenomenon as structural properties. 
The macro-level influence forms as a holistic phenomenon of mutual influence, con-
straints or strategies, while all the players perform intelligently in this environment. 
These structure connections can play crucial role where the collective intelligence 
feature appears. 
A multiagent environment can be classified as self-interested, cooperative, or 
competitive according to an agents' goal. Here, a self-interested environment differs 
from a competitive, where all agents are not competing with others as a general-sum 
game as in a competitive environment. Thus, we examine the structure from these 
three general multiagent environments: self-interested random graphical game play-
ing, distributed cooperative team playing, and competitive group competition. In 
each scenario, we analyze the structure in each environmental setting and demon-
strate a structure learned as a comprehensive representation: structure of players' 
action influence, structure of constraints in teamwork communication, and structure 
of inter-connections among strategies. This structure represents macro-level knowl-
edge arising in a multiagent system, and provides critical, holistic information for 
each problem domain. 
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3.2 Understanding the Multiagent Problem: Structure 
and Dynamics 
Before we present our perspective on how to tackle multiagent systems, we focus on 
understanding the common characteristics in multiple players games. More specif-
ically, we seek to understand the structure formed by a large number of agents in 
a multiagent system. The structure of a multiagent system reveals characteristics, 
which provides critical information for solving multiagent system problems. 
How does each player perform efficiently in a multiagent environment? To find 
an answer to this question, we explore which diagram can describe multiagent sys-
tem procedures. Firstly, we analyze that common characteristics underlying network 
models which are naturally formed (socially or biologically), by inspecting all con-
nections existing among nodes. Then, a "preferential pub choosing" example is 
given to demonstrate large scale agent networks. In contrast to large scale multi-
agent networks, we introduce another interesting phenomenon appearing in group 
population: replicator dynamics. 
3.2.1 Large Scale of Agent System's Structure Characteristics 
A network graph model, G = (V, E), is composed of a collection of N vertices (or 
nodes) V, and lists of edges E. Each vertex represents an individual player; while 
every edge connects a pair of nodes that are neighbours. One typical example of a 
large scale multiagent environment is social networks. Social networks are formed by 
a number of persons, where each has ties with others. In social networks, each player 
performs in this complex network, and the structure of a social network plays a role. 
Each large scale network is formed from a large number of individuals, where each in-
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dividual is unique microscopically, however, they emerge with common macroscopic 
characteristics. In this section, we introduce three distinct visual characteristics that 
exist in large networks: heavy-tailed degree distribution (Broder et al., 2000), small 
·diameter (Travers and Milgram, 1969), and high clustering of connectivity (Watts 
and Strogatz, 1998; Watts, 1999; Strogatz, 2001; Boccaletti et al., 2006). 
Heavy-tailed degree distribution 
In large universal networks, a large number of connections exist and each node 
has influence on various numbers of neighbors. A mathematical model is needed 
to differentiate the influential nodes from all the nodes in the network. Plot a 
histogram between the number of connections each node holds and the number 
of same influential nodes which exist together. The relations follow a power-law 
distribution, rather than follow a bell-shaped normal distribution. The power-law 
qistribution is also called heavy tail distribution, known as the "80-20" rule. The 
statistical characteristic of heavy-tailed is that it is linearly on a log-log scale. 
y = probability(x) ex xk. 
To illustrate the characteristics of social networks, . we illustrate how to choose 
a pub as an example. At scenario one, each customer chooses a pub uniformly at 
random, ignoring how many others are currently there at each pub. In Figure :Ll 
(a), it shows that the distribution of number of customers and the number of pubs 
which contain the same customer volume, which follows the 'bell' curve. At scenario 
two, each customer chooses a pub to go which is more popular. Figure ~U (b) shows 
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the customer numbers and the number of pubs with the same capacity follows a 
heavy tail distribution. Figure ~3.1 gives a demonstration for this pub phenomenon 
and presents the heavy tail characteristic. This example demonstrates the "rich get 
richer" phenomenon, which is also shown as heavy tail distribution. 
0 
·O 5 10 15 20 25 
number of customers number of customers log(number of custormers) 
Figure 3.1: Pub choice (Artificial data): (a). Normal distribution: each customer chooses 
a pub uniformly at random, ignoring how many others are currently there; (b). Power law 
distribution: customer chooses a pub proportionally to its current popularity count; ( c). 
Log-log scale of number of customers and number of pubs. 
Small diameter 
The distance between two vertices is the length of the shortest path connecting 
them. The diameter of a network is the average distance between pairs. It measures 
how near or far typical individuals are from each other. According the definition of 
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diameter, in a N node graph G, the smallest diameter of G is 1, which suggests a 
fully connected network and all N(N -1)/2 edges exists. The largest diameter exists 
in a chain graph, which is linear in N. In large scale networks, small diameter exists, 
considering the large population size, also known as small world of "six degrees of 
separation", (log(N) or log(log(N))). 
. Li,j d( i, j) 
diameter(G) = N(N _ l)/2, 
where i, j are any node in G. 
High clustering 
A clustering coefficient is a measure of how densely tied together edges are in a 
graph. Locally, the clustering coefficient of node Vi describes as the fraction of pairs 
(or friends that are also friends). Formally, let ki is the degree of vi, which also 
means the number of neighbours of Vi. Thereafter, the maximum number of edges 
ejk among node Vi's neighbourhood Ni is ~ki(ki -1), where Vj, Vk E Ni, and ejk EE. 
That is, every neighbour node of Vi is connected with every other neighbour node 
of vi. Let c(vi) denote the fraction of these actual edges that exist, which stand for 
friends of Vi that are also friends: 
The clustering coefficient of graph G is defined as the average of c( vi) over all the 
nodes Vi in G: 
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Let p be the edge density of the graph G: 
llEll 
P = N(N - 1)/2. 
When C(G) « p, we say graph G is highly clustered. 
When speculating about the connections among all the players, large scale so-
cial networks form those three common characteristics. However, when a group of 
diversified players co-exist in a game, another interesting phenomenon appears in 
the population: replicator dynamics. 
3.2.~ Replicator Dynamics 
Replicator dynamics presents an evolutionary selection phenomenon appearing in 
variant population evolutionary processes. 
Assume that, 1, 2, ... , N types exist in a population distribution. Given that po : 
0 0 n d no 0 0 n h h t . h . t . . t. 1 d" t . b t. p1 , p2 , ... , Pn, an : 1T 1 , 1T 2 , ... , 1T n, w ere eac ype i as I s m1 Ia is n u 10n 
of ·P? and payoff 7r~. At each time step t, all individual types are rational to be 
updated to choose the highest payoff. Thus, at time t + 1, the proportion of each 
type i is updated as follows: 
(3.1) 
The replicator equation Eq. ~U describes the fitness function to incorporate the 
distribution of population types and provides the essence of selection. 
Furthermore, Fisher's fundamental theorem (Fisher, 1930) states that the rate of 
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increase in fitness of any organism is proportional to its genetic variance in fitness at 
that time. Higher variance genetically increases the rate of adaptation. Accordingly, 
designing high variance in a multiagent system for agent payoff distribution utilizes 
the higher rate of fitness and payoff. 
Take the following example, to demonstrate the replicator dynamics which ap-
pears within these three groups of individuals: with different variance in the payoff 
evolutionary processes. Given three groups G1, G2, G3, each group has four types 
of individuals with initial distribution pO: and each individual type's payoff rr0 . For 
example, Figure 3.2 shows that one random group population is generated and pre-
sented, where four types of individuals co-exist in this size 100 population. Each has 
a proportion of Pi percentage in the population, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Respectively, 
each type of individual has its fitness Pi-fitness. 
In the following, we present three groups of population and illustrate their evolu-
tion process. Assuming all groups start with the same level of overall fitness (mean 
of each group), we analyze the overall fitness changes over time as appearing dif-
ferent group distribution and fitness variance. According to Eq. ::u, after one time 
step, each group's distribution changes, as well as the overall fitness of the group. 
The fitness and the adaptation gain calculation is as follows. 
• Given: 
Group 1: pO = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), rr0 = [10, 20, 30, 40]. 
Group 2: po= [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), rr0 = [5, 15, 35, 45]. 
Group 3: po= [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4], rr0 = [O, 10, 40, 50]. 
• Each group's mean, variance and overall group fitness are: 
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Figure 3.2: Replicator dynamics simulation 
mean(G1) = 25, var(G1) = 166.67, 
n=4 
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fitness 0 (G1) =I>?* 7r? = 1/4 * 10 + 1/4 * 20 + 1/4 * 30 + 1/4 * 40 = 25; 
i=l 
Group 2: 
mean( G2) = 25, var( G2) = 333.33, 
n=4 
fitness 0 (G2) = LPt * 7r[ = 1/4*5+1/4*15+1/4·* 35 + 1/4 * 45 = 25; 
i=l 
Group 3: 
mean( G3) = 25, var( G3) = 566.67, 
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n=4 
fitness 0 (G3) =LP}* n-} = 1/4 * 0 + 1/4 * 10 + 1/4 * 40 + 1/4 * 50 = 25; 
i=l 
• After one time step, each group's distribution of four types individuals updates, 
as follows: 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Group 3: 
1 1/4*10 I 
Pl = = 1 10 25 ' 
1=1/4*30 =3/10 
P3 25 ' 
1 = 1/4 * 5 = 5/100 
P1 25 ' 
1 = 1/4 * 35 = 35/100 
P3 25 ' 
1_1/4*0-0 
P1 - 25 - ' 
1 = 1/4 * 20 = 2/10 
P2 25 ' 
Pa= 1/4 * 40 = 4/10. 
25 
1 1/4*15 
P2 = 25 = 15/100, 
1 1/4 * 45 
p4 = 25 = 45/100. 
1 = 1/4 * 10 = 1/10 
P2 25 ' 
1=1/4*40 =4/10 1=1/4*50 =5/10. 
P3 25 ' P4 25 
• Thus, the new overall fitness of each group and its adaptation gain is as follows: 
Group 1: 
n=4 
fitness 1(G1) =LP} *7rf = 1/10* 10+2/10*20+3/10*30+4/10*40 = 30, 
i=l 
Gain(G1) = fitness 1(G1) - fitness 0(G1) = 30 - 25 = 5. 
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Group 2: 
n=4 
fitness 1(G2) = LP}*?Tl = 5/100*5+15/100*15+35/100*.35+45/100*45 =· 35, 
i=l 
Gain(G2) = fitness 1 (G2) - fitness 0 (G2) = 35 - 25 = 10. 
Group 3: 
n=4 
fitness 1(G3) =LP}* ?Tl= 0 * 5 + 1/10 * 10 + 4/10 * 40 + 5/10 * 50 = 42, 
i=l 
Gain( G3) = fitness 1 ( G3) - f itness0 ( G3) = 42 - 25 = 17. 
As these calculations show, the three groups of individuals, Gi, G2, G3 , start 
with the same level of fitness; then one time step selection, (according to the simple 
rule: each type is rational to choose the highest payoff), results in three different 
fitness levels: 30, 35 and 42, respectively. Group 3 with the largest variance level 
ends with the highest fitness level. 
In all, replicator dynamics reveals diversified players' evolutionary process. The 
higher variance exists in a group, the higher fitness a population leads to. However, 
after a number of selections, t -+ oo, the whole population reaches an equilibrium, 
regardless of the initial distribution of each type. The equilibrium only depends on 
the evolutionary updating rule. In this example, since each type's rational choice is 
to move to a higher payoff, the highest payoff is the principal criterion in the game. 
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3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we state that our research methodology of a new unified frame-
work pr~vides macro-level holistic information formed among agents. This struc-
ture property exists and is important to solving multiagent problems. Furthermore, 
we illustrate the characteristics which form in large scale networks: heavy-tailed, 
.small diameter and high clustering. This analysis provides insights into how to 
solve problems arising in multiagent systems by taking account of their important 
features. Replicator dynamics demonstrates that the evolutionary selection rule 
appears in diversified populations. That is, high variance among the population 
leads to higher fitness in the evolutionary process. More importantly, these features 
provide us with guidance about how to design a multiagent system in agent-based 
simulations, utilizing these structural characteristics and features to simplify the 
problem solving-process in large-scale networks. 
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Structure in Graphical Games 
After revealing the important characteristics that exist among multiple-player games 
in Chapter :3, we further explore the structure connection of mutual influence be-
tween players' action choices in game playing. Much multiagent system and learn-
ing research have been performed from both machine learning and game theoretic 
perspectives. However, characterizing a multiagent system as a multiple players 
game, little research on how to abstract structure among players' actions has been 
performed. In this chapter, we provide a structure learning algorithm, "Multi-
Descendent Regression Learning Structure Algorithm" (MDRLSA), to extract the 
action connections from graphical games. Knowing the influence between players' 
action choice can provide a compact representation for player's utility function, as 
well as reduce the search space for each player's learning process. 
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4.1 Graphical Games 
Graphical games (Kearns et al., 2001) are a representation of multiplayer games to 
capture direct influence among players. A graphical game is described as an undi-
rected graph G in which players are represented as vertices, and each edge identifies 
influence between two vertices. In many natural settings, a player, vertex v, has 
payoffs that are specified by the action of v and those neighbours of v who have 
influence over v. In normal form representation, each player's payoff is given by a 
complete matrix with all players' action choice. However, each player's neighbour 
set is usually a small subset of the complete player set. Rather than give the entire 
population's normal form game, a graphical structure gives a direct and visual rep-
resentation of the relationship among all the players. Graphical games are a suitable 
representation when sparse strong influences exist, whereas when there exists a large 
number of weak influences on each player, congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973) are 
applicable. 
In our research, we generate multiplayer random graphical games represented 
in normal form using GAMUT (Nudelman et al., 2004). GAMUT is a suite of 
game generators designated for testing game-theoretic algorithms. A set of random 
graphical games are generated in GAMUT as experimental data input. For example, 
Figure 4J. describes a six player random graphical game. In this game, each player 
has a choice action representing from 1 to 6, and total connections among players 
are represented as 10 edges. Each ed.ge is a randomly selected connection between 
two players which determines/influences the payoff received for each player. In order 
to compare among different games, we normalize each game's payoff between 0 and 
1. A strategy set [2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1] represents all players' action choice at one stage of 
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the game, which indicates that player 1 chooses action 2, while player 2 chooses 
action 2, and player 3, 4, 5, 6 all choose action 1. These action combinations (also 
called a "strategy"), gives payoffs for player 1 to player 6 as follows respectively: 
[0.95, 0.19, 0.34, 0.13, 0.55, 0.77]. In Figure ·U, normal form representation of this 6-
player game states total number of 46656 (66) action profiles and the corresponding 
utilities for each player. 
#Players: 6 
#Actions: 666666 
#players'. 6 
# actions: (6) 
# graph: RandomGraph 
# 9raph_params: (-nodes 6 -edges 10 I 
# Graph Params: 
#I nodes: 6, edges: 10, sym_edges: rrue, reflex_ok: false I 
(1 l l 1 l 1): ( 0.9888893423258294 0.14518868307974256 0.34666415138496487 0.038023128819446826 0.23594170400592485 0.8738306301416572 J 
12 l 1 l l 11: I 0.6493444991678932 0.4155071673789125 0.34666415138496487 0.6590567860324859 0.4222770159171085 o.8738306301416572 I 
(3 1 1 1 l 1): [ 0.15193090776347526 0.12172733762196959 0.34666415138496487 0.06639426478458674 0.6214207116085547 0.8738306301416572) 
[4 l l l l 1): ( 0.26835599384705083 0.40252547595207655 0.34666415138496487 0.3413822595203671 0.7823505773305243 0.8738306301416572) 
[5 l l l l 1): ( 0.27927189630690374 0.9420454036400943 0.34666415138496487 0.1561862143425638 0.42474057576059127 0.8738306301416572) 
[6 l l 1 l 1): [ 0.16448162057531782 0.12410679110797923 0.34666415138496487 0.30514189249923224 0.4003220019315194 0.8738306301416572) 
[l 2 l l l 1): ( 0.8218136574744752 0.02561315741805365 0.34666415138496487 0.18312778713997557 0.5239682518208068 0.7784223673233747) 
[2 2 1 l l 1): [ 0.9571011063043914 0.19445471692083255 0.34666415138496487 0.1308573184007137 0.5541933771691710.7784223673233747) 
[3 2 l l l 1): [ 0.21233316527055482 0.19483193314310926 0.34666415138496487 0.36152466372865794 0.2782392490110991 0.7784223673233747) 
(4 2 l 1 l 1): [ 0.3499919411739944 0.34847870983594015 0.34666415138496487 0.37912818965244816 0.2541553162085356 0.7784223673233747) 
(5 2 l l l 1): ( 0.7256479919065064 0.09740757528133273 0.34666415138496487 0.7004412054712835 0.06608667126949293 0.7784223673233747 J 
[6 2 l l l l): [ 0.07736411265241327 0.80196529434451210.346664151384964870.38621656995429077 0.7295648258788623 0.7784223673233747) 
Figure 4.1: Data sample from a 6-player random graphical game 
Inn-player games, assuming that each player has the same number of a actions, 
normal-form representation requires an entries of action profiles to describe multiple 
players' utilities. However, as the number of players n increases, the action profiles 
size grows exponentially. Thus, a compact, visual representation to capture how 
every player's action choice influence others' utilities is interesting and critical. In 
the following section, we introduce a multi-gradient descendent regression model to 
learn a graphical structure representation of multiple players games from the normal 
form representation. 
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4.2 Learning Structure Algorithm: MDRLSA 
In this section, we present a novel graphical structure learning algorithm for mul-
tiagent graphical games, called "Multi-Descendent Regression Learning Structure 
Algorithm" (MDRLSA). The MDRLSA uses a regression model to learn a player's 
utility f~nction. Our hypothesis is that each player's utility function can be rep-
resented as a linear function of all players' individual action choices. Thus, the 
algorithm proceeds in two steps. In the first step, given all players' action profiles as 
input: ,define parameters 0 and fit 0 to all players' utility profiles Y = [Y1Y2 ... Ynp], 
where np is the total number of players. The hypothesis hek (x) is given as Eq. 4.1 
linear model 
Okx = Bok + 01kx1 + · · · + OjkXj, 
Bok 
(4.1) 
To simplify the explanation, we assume all np players have the same number 
of action choices, denoted by na. We apply multi-gradient descendent to achieve 
the objective of linear regression for each player k, which is to minimize its cost 
function, J, Eq. 4.2: 
J(O~) = 2~ ~ ( ho,(x(i)) -yk')f (4.2) 
8 [O~ ... o: ... O~p]. 
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Here, m is the total count of action profile, which is n~a; and Bk is the transpose 
of fh. Xj indicates a player's action choice, where Xj = 1 indicates taking action Xj 
and Xj = 0 indicates action Xj is not chosen. In np players game, [x1, x2, ... , xnal 
describes the first payer's action profile, and [xna+li Xna+2, ... , Xna+na] represents 
the second player's action profile, and so on. Here, j E [1, np * na], np x na is the total 
number of bits used to represent a strategy profile. As in 6 player game and each 
has 6 action choices, the action profile number mis 66 = 46656, and [x1, x2, ... , x36] 
stands for each player's action choice towards ai, a2, ... , a5. X = [x1, x2, ... , x35] 
includes each player's action profile, see Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: np player' action mapping 
The objective is to minimize the cost function value J(B) by adjusting the (}j 
values. In batch gradient descent, each iteration simultaneously update Bj for all j 
in Eq. ·±.:3: 
. ·- 1 ~ ( (i) (i) ) (i) fJ1k .- f)jk - am ~ ho(xk - Yk ) xjk. (4.3) 
In this experiment, we randomly initialize the initial parameters 8 to 0, the 
learning rate a to 0.01 and number of iteration as 400. This procedure is designed 
to observe the performance of our hypothesis linear regression model, in order to 
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Figure 4.3: Convergence of gradient descent with learning rate a= 0.01 
avoid the model over-fitting or under-fitting the data. Figure 4.'.3 shows the cost 
function J(fJk) as each player's utility loss function is decreasing as the number of 
iteration increases. This decrease of cost function J proves that our linear model 
hypothesis Eq. 4.J is correct description between players' action choice and their 
utilities. However, this batch gradient descent learning is quite slow. Thus, in large 
. number of data entries, we choose normal equation Eq. 4.4 to optimize () instead. 
As we can see in Eq. 4.4, until converge as in gradient descent, Eq. ·4.4 includes no 
loop in the program, and learning rate a is not required. 
(4.4) 
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where 
Yok 
Ylk 
Yk = 
Yjk 
In the second step, according the parameter 8, we map the coefficiency between 
each .player's action choice and the given utility. Algorithm 2 describes the graph-
ical structure learning algorithm MDRLSA, which indicates whether the influence 
between players are related or independent. The graph parameter is represented in 
a binary n x n matrix: each entry value '1' indicated related, whereas 'O' indicates 
independent. 
4.3 Results and Analysis 
We develop the Multi-Descendent Regression Learning Structure Algorithm in Mat-
lab (see Appendix A), which provides a graphical structure representation among 
players actions' influence for multiagent graphical games. 
Taking one random graph game with six players, six actions and ten number of 
influence edges as an example, the learned player influence among them is shown in 
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Algorithm 2: MDRLSA 
Data: 
X :=. action_profile; 
U := utility _profile; 
Result: graph_param; 
begin 
Step 1: calculate 8 parameter; 
Initialize: 
8= [); 
for each player i do 
I 
y=U(:,i); 
8 = [8, normalEqn(X, y)]; 
end 
Step 2: map coefficiency graph_param; 
Initialize: 
E ;=: 0.00001 
data := 1 -7 na rows in 8 
[m, n] :=size( data); 
graph_param := ones(n,n); 
temp_coef := zeros(n,n); 
for each column player i do 
a := data(:,i); 
for each row player j do 
/ / read game file; 
/ / n is number of player; 
/ / set an x n matrix to all ls; 
/ / Set a n x n matrix to all Os; 
/ / ith column in data; 
player_coef = a((j -1) * (m/n) + 1: ((j -1) * (m/n) + n)); 
/ / yth row player's all action coefficient in a; 
a_norm =player _coefmean(player _coef); 
/ / normalize player _coef between 0 and 1 as a_norm; 
temp_coef(j, i) = sum(abs(a_norm - ones(n, 1))); 
/ / calculate the sum of all the absolute difference between a_norm and all true 
n x 1 connections; 
if temp_coef(j, i) < E then 
/ / any choice of yth row player's action's influence on ith column player 
small than Ej 
graph_param(j,i) = O; 
/ / fiag unrelated player j €3 i as O; 
end 
end 
end 
end 
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the following matrix: 
player 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
2 1 1 0 1 1 1 
3 0 0 1 1 1 0 
graph_param = (4.5) 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the conversion of Eq. -L) into graphical structure represen-
tation. 
Figure 4.4: 6 player graphical game structure 
In GAMUT, graph structure is represented as a list of neighbors of all nodes. 
By definition, graph G is undirected; thus, two nodes connected by one edge have 
mutual influence between them. Moreover, each player's action choice results in its 
utility. That is, each player is its own factor. Thus, each player does not have its 
own node in the neighbor list, as well as one edge's two nodes only appear once 
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in the neighbor lists. A 6-player random graphical game's structure is shown in 
GAMUT as lists of each node's neighbors in the following way: 
node 1: 2,4,5 
node 2: 4,5,6 
node 3: 4,5 
node 4: 5,6 
node5: 
node6: 
Comparing the structure shown in Eq. 4.3 with the benchmark generated by 
GAMUT, MDRLSA learns an accurate underlying structure for a 6-player random 
graphical game. 
We test on a set of random graphical games with different number of players, 
actions and number of influence edges generated from GAMUT (see Table 1.1.J.). The 
program runs in Matlab on Mac OS X, with Processor 2.8GHz Intel Core i7, Memory 
8GB 1067MHz. The run time shown in Table 4.1 is one single run of MDRLSA. 
With the same graphical game, the run time varies in the scale of 10-1 of a random 
run time. For instance, a 5-player, 3-action game with 5-influence edges, the run 
time differs in 0.001 seconds. Given the listed random generated graphical games in 
the table, the structures learned are shown in Figure 4.5. MDRLSA shows a robust 
promising results of learning structure representation efficiently and effectively in 
random graphical games. The runnning time increases linearly to the number of 
strategy profiles. 
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Player :\"umber Action Number Number of Influence (Edges) R.uutime (Seconds) Accuracy(%) Normal Form Profile Entries 
4 3 3 0.0055 100 81 
4 4 4 0.0071 100 256 
5 3 5 0.0117 100 243 
5 4 6 0.0098 100 1024 
5 5 7 0.0318 100 3125 
6 4 5 0.0311 100 4096 
6 5 8 0.1007 100 15625 
6 6 10 0.3078 100 46656 
Table 4.1: Random graphical games experimental details 
4.4 Comparison 
Duong et a.l., 2009 give a structure learning algorithm for graphical game struc-
ture learning. Their approach comes from a game theoretical perspective, which 
constructs a loss function and focuses on minimizing the loss of utility function in 
strategy choice. However, our approach comes from a machine learning perspective, 
and focuses on revealing the coeffi.ciency between all the action choices and the out-
come utility. Through the correlated coefficiency, the relative neighbour influence 
is identified. Both approaches are tested on GAMUT generated games. However, 
without demonstrating this in the same programming languages, we cannot eval-
uate the run time efficiency difference on both methodologies. Comparing both 
approaches, there are methodological advantages despite lack of theoretic analysis. 
Our approach is intuitive, straightforward and simple. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we demonstrate the structure properties in a self-interested mul-
tiagent environment. In simulated GAMUT random graphical games, we present 
the Multi-Descendent Regression Learning Structure Algorithm to learn a com-
pact representation among agents' action influence towards each other. The Multi-
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(a) 4 players, 3 actions, 3 edges (b) 4 players, 4 actions, 4 edges 
( c) 5 players, 3 actions, 5 edges ( d) 5 players, 4 actions, 6 edges ( e) 5 players, 5 actions, 7 edges 
(f) 6 players, 4 actions, 5 edges (g) 6 players, 5 actions, 8 edges (h) 6 players, 6 actions, 10 edges 
Figure 4.5: MDRLSA learned graphical structures 
Descendent Regression Learning Structure Algorithm tests on a set of randomly 
generated graphical games. Experiments demonstrate that MDRLSA is suited to 
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various graphical game applications, and provides promising results. The structure 
representation compared with normal form utility matrices reduces search space 
and identifies the mutual action influence among agents. MDRLSA can learn a 
good representation for games and MAS where there are sparse strong influences in 
individual player payoff. 
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Chapter 5 
Structure in Teamwork 
Communication among agents through connections in a network is one important 
aspect in a multiagent system. In a cooperative environment, agents communi-
cate with neighbours and achieve the goal of higher total payoff overall. When 
exclusively acquiring information from neighbours, the time consumption increases 
exponentially to the scale of network inter-connection complexity. Our research ex-
ploits the influence of utilizing the structure information while performing, which 
can improve the optimal exploration strategy in a cooperative environment, so that 
the time consumption and overall payoff achievement is balanced. 
In a multiagent system, incomplete information of strategy payoff is common 
iJ,1 real applications. For instance, in the mobile ad hoc network domain, a group 
df cooperative agents explore in a distributed manner within limited time steps in 
a given environment to maximize the overall total payoff, with some uncertainty 
of local payoff. In this setting, each agent explores its surroundings to maximize 
the overall payoff and moves toward equilibrium. However, how to use a lower 
level of optimization among agents that leads to high overall payoff with limited 
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time steps is a critical issue between the trade-off in exploration and exploitation. 
Our experiments demonstrate that, in a densely connected network, single agent's 
optimization can achieve 983 of a double agent's optimization, but the difference 
of overall payoff is achieved by higher level optimization with a large trade-off of 
time consumption. Thus, knowing the agent's connection structure, it is helpful to 
choose an optimal strategy for overall performance within the time constraint. 
5.1 Ad hoc Networks 
Our researcn chooses the mobile ad hoc network (MANET) domain as an example. 
A wireless ad hoc network is a self-configuring routable networking environment on 
top of a link-layer ad hoc network. A number of wireless sensor agents are free to 
move independently in any direction and change links to other agents frequently. 
Agents communicate with their neighbours according to preset topology connections, 
and forward traffic unrelated to their own use. The signal strength between agent 
communication varies in different locations. In the field, the primary challenge in 
building a MANET is to equip each device to continuously maintain the information 
required to route traffic properly while performing its tasks. Thus, our goal is to 
let each agent freely move to an optimal position in order to maximize the overall 
signal strength between all connected agent pairs, and maintain the information 
forwarding routes. 
5.2 Rationale and Hypothesis 
Scalability with the number of agents is a critical problem for multiagent learning. 
Multiagent learning involves multiple agents' behaviours in order to solve a com-
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mon task, thus the search space can grow exponentially according to the number of 
agents and the complexity of agent behaviour. The evaluation criteria for learning 
methods should be standardized with respect to their scalability. In cooperative 
multiagent systems, to optimize a global objective has been addressed as DCOPs 
with promising results. Research on finding globally optimal DCOP algorithms has 
been provided, such as ADOPT where this proves that DCOPs are NP-hard (I\.fodi 
et a.I., 2005). Thus, when the number of agents increases, regarding both computa-
tional and communication requirements, the scalability needs to be improved. 
Our hypothesis is that exploiting a k-optimal strategy to obtain payoff is associ-
ated with the topology network density. In Modi et al., 200.5, a class of 'incomplete' 
algorithms, k-optimal has been provided. A k-optimal algorithm defines that at 
every time step, a number of k agents coordinate their action choices to reach equi-
librium, where no single agent's change of its action choice can improve the overall 
performance, such as achieving higher total payoff for all agents. As the number of 
k increases, the computation of reaching k equilibrium grows exponentially. That 
is, choosing I-optimal, 2-optimal or k-optimal algorithm, this choice influences the 
performance to balance agents' total payoff and time consumption, and is directly 
associated according to agents' connection network density. Thus, in MANET do-
main, large number of sensors (agents) are required. Thus, I-optimal, 2-optimal 
algorithms are applied to explore agents' total payoff with time constraints, and no 
triplet teamwork is chosen for relatively large numbers of agents. 
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5.3 An Adaptive Teamwork Algorithm: Static Estimated 
(SE)-Adaptive 
In this section, we introduce SE-Adaptive, which can run either I-optimal or 2-
optimal algorithm per agent, improving the overall performance of the team. An 
agent running SE-Adaptive can decide whether to use I-optimal or 2-optimal algo-
rithm, depending on the number of neighbors it has. 
Our hypothesis is that the connection density rate is an important potential 
factor in determining the level of teamwork required. We conducted three sets of 
experiments which include same number of rounds and variable settings: one set 
tested the full graph (where each agent has n - I connections), while another tested 
chain graphs. In sparse topology, single agent movements are optimal, whereas in 
dense topology, high levels of team movement are rewarding. Thus, we choose the 
most sparse topology chain, as well as the most densely structured, fully connected 
network, and a third type of "hybrid" graphs as agents teamwork constraint (com-
munication) structures. "Hybrid" graphs are constructed such that half ( l !J) of 
the agents form a connected clique, and the remainder of the agents form a chain 
connected to one agent in the clique. 
We define connection density rate, denoted by r, as the fraction of an agent's 
connection over the maximum connection number: r = agenLnum_connec~ion. Algo-
max_num_connections 
rithm ;3 describes how the SE-Adaptive performs on connected agents topologies 
with different densities. A heuristic value r = ! is learned empirically from the set 
of experiments described above. When r ::S ! , an agent chooses k = I individual 
movements as the optimal strategy; otherwise, agents move together with another 
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agent as an optimal pair to obtain maximum rewards, where k = 2. 
Algorithm 3: SE-ADAPTIVE 
Data: connected agents networks with assignments; 
Result: optimal gain and assignments overall the team; 
for each neighbor i do 
Send variable assignment and reward matrices to i; 
if r ~!then 
Find max gain and perform I-optimal algorithm: 
g, a f- getMaxGainAndAssignment{); 
Send Bid g to all neighbors; 
else 
Find max gain and perform 2-optimal algorithm: 
g', a' f- getMaxGainAndAssignment{); 
Send Bid g' to all neighbors; 
end 
Receive variable assignment and reward matrices from i; 
end 
5.4 Experiment Results and Analysis 
In this section, we provide SE-Adaptive algorithm to perform on connected agents 
topology with different densities. The number of agents ranged from 10 to I5. 
Comparing the performance of each test on I-optimal and 2-optimal algorithms, 
Figure S, l 'and Figure 5, 2 show the results of using different numbers of agents 
running on different graph topologies for 50 rounds. SE-Adaptive performs as well 
as the best of I-optimal and 2-optimal algorithms on chain and complete graphs. 
SE-Adaptive agents in the clique use 2-optimal algorithm and SE-Adaptive agents 
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in the chain use I-optimal algorithm, outperforming both algorithms individually. 
In Figure 5. 1 and Figure 5.2, the x-axis is the number of agents and the y-axis 
shows the reward value of net gain. We run three sets of experiments on full, chain 
and hybrid topologies for 30 independent trials. Here, hybrid topology is defined· 
as half ( l ~ J) fully connected graph and half ( r ~ l) chain graph. In each trial, an 
agent could explore up to 50 positions in 50 rounds (i.e., variable settings), and 
obtain its rewards. In general, an agent will not explore all 50. In Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 5.2, the average of 30 trials rewards shows rewards obtained in three different 
algorithms. k=I means I-optimal: solo exploration; k=2 means 2-optimal: pairwise 
exploration; and SE-Adaptive means a combination of choices of solo and pairwise. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates a group of fully-connected and chain-connected agents. In 
various sizes of group density for agent numbers 10-I5, the performance of k = I, 
k = 2, and SE-Adaptive algorithms, Figure 5.1 shows that pairwise exploration 
(k = 2) gains higher rewards compared with solo exploration (k = I), and the SE-
Adaptive algorithm chooses to move pairwise and gain the same rewards as k=2. 
Whereas, on a chain topology, solo exploration performs the best on a sparse chain 
topology, while the SE-Adaptive algorithm gives a similar optimal performance, 
both with high time efficiency. On the other hand, pairwise exploration can give 
better performance in a dense topology but performs poorly in a sparse topology; 
both situations have low time efficiency. 
Figure 5. 2 combines a maximum dense topology and a minimum connection 
topology in one graph, where the SE-Adaptive algorithm can choose a level of team-
work based on the neighbour connections and gives the best performance among the 
three. In a group of agents, agent numbers 10-I9, the result shows that the aver-
age of net gain obtained by SE-Adaptive algorithm is higher than the average net 
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Figure 5.1: full and chain topology, agent number: 10-15 
gain of using either k=l or k = 2 only one at time alone, but with much less time 
consumption. 
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Figure 5.2: Hybrid topology, agent number: 10-19 
The implementation and demonstration is tested on existing platform DCEE 
Python simulation code1 . The runtime of each test on the I-optimal algorithm on all 
three types of topologies is on the scale of minutes, agent numbers ranged from 10-15; 
whereas, the runtime on the 2-optimal algorithm on dense and hybrid topologies is on 
a magnitude of hours, where 2-optimal algorithm considers all possible pairs among 
n number of agents and that there are O(n2) such pairs, and that this makes it much 
1http: I /teamcore. use. cdu/dcop, version 0.9.2/5/2010. 
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slower than the 1-optimal algorithm. However, applying the SE-Adaptive algorithm 
on dense topology reduces the runtime to a matter of minutes, the same scale as 
1-optimal algorithm. With double agents' teamwork, 2-optimal considers O(n2) 
such pairs, but achieves worse performance for net gains in a chain connection (see 
Figure 5.1). SE-Adaptive identifies when to choose 1-optimal algorithm according to 
the density rate r. In a chain topology, SE-Adaptive chooses I-optimal since every 
agent satisfies the criterion of r = n:_l ::; !, when total agent number n 2: 7. While 
in hybrid topology, SE-Adaptive switches from 1-optimal to 2-optimal when the 
connection density rater> !, where only a small number of highly clustered agents 
choose 2-optimal algorithm and benefit from teamwork, see Figure 5.2. Meanwhile, 
the runtime of SE-Adaptive algorithm remains on the scale of I-optimal. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we demonstrate the importance of topology structure in a coop-
erative multiagent environment. By analyzing the structure of agents' constraints, 
we present an adaptive teamwork algorithm: SE-Adaptive, to choose optimal level 
of movement in various density constraints (i.e., communication) networks. Ex-
perimental results of SE-Adaptive algorithm give promise to this new concept of 
adaptive learning according to structure density among agent neighbors. Wisely 
chosen teamwork gives multiagent learning an important component to achieve an 
optimal performance within limited time in a dynamic environment. 
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Chapter 6 
Structure Learning in Artificial 
Life Simulation 
In this chapter, we capture the merits of an agents behavior strategy using a graph-
ical model representation, while adapting to environmental changes. Bayesian net-
works (BN) are applied to demonstrate the inter-relationship of the adaptation 
strategies for agents' evolution according to environmental changes. We present a 
simulation of artificial life (AL): where two groups of agents compete for resources 
to survive in one community. This research is not intended to predict which agents 
or which group of agents can survive, but rather illustrate that agents adapt to 
environmental changes and that the inter-connections among the characteristics of 
those agents with the best behavioural strategies survive. 
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6.1 Rationale for Artificial Life Paradigm 
In our research, we exploit the Artificial Life concept by building a simple ecology 
system: ALGAE (Artificial Life Genetic Algorithm Expression). The ALGAE con-
cept is inspired by the evolutionary epoch of Homo Sapiens where two divergent 
species existed in a primitive environment to survive as the primary biological goal. 
The initial ALGAE simulation (Yan and Cercone, 201.0a.) analyzed agents competing 
for resources in an uncertain environment, where that ALGAE simulation provided 
artificial gene data. There are three aspects in this section which are derived from 
this perspective. Firstly, we show the environmental factors which determine the 
living conditions of the two species who are the subject of the experiment. Sec-
ondly, we explore the key genetic combinations which favor survival, with details 
about the intrinsic chromosomes and their variability during the evolutionary pro-
cess. These environmental control settings and group agents' energy consumption 
are set up through the user's interface. This feature promotes understanding of the 
dynamics between species survival and environmental factors. Lastly, we reveal the 
hidden dependencies among fittest behaviour strategies' genomic descriptors which 
emerge during evolution of the species. We apply Bayesian network structure learn-
ing to show these relations among the genetic factors through the evolving strategy 
adaptation to environmental changes. 
6.2 ALGAE System Design 
Creation of a virtual artificial environment to emulate human populations is rel-
atively straightforward. Two populations are devised and designated as separate 
species. These species co-exist in a competitive relationship, the goal of which is 
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merely survival. By reproducing, mutating, and fighting, the program refines its 
variables, evolving to the point where the best solution is generated. Survival of the 
fittest mimics the evolution of living organisms' adaptation. Genetic fitness is one 
index of survivability. 'Rules' exist to govern the existence and inter-relationship of 
the two species in this artificial 'world', called a 'dynamic simulation framework'. 
These rules pertain to the constraints of the environment. Specifically, they address 
limitations which impinge on each species survival probabilities. 
As AL simulates real organisms in their functioning and characteristics, genetics 
represents the information systems essential to evolution of genetic information so 
that species both survive and adapt over tii;ne. Our model uses standard pertinent 
factors in the artificial environment setting. There are basic operational rules, a 
well-defined virtual environment or search space, and behavioural constraints on 
the population species. 
6.2.1 Description 
In ALGAE, resources must exist, and these resources are distributed in a two di-
mensional grid randomly. We postulate two types of species in this virtual world: 
Species type 'O' and Species type '1'. They survive in the virtual environment 
through competition for resources and obey these rules: species mate within their 
own species only, when minimum amount of energy reserved; each one subsist on 
native honey resource as a form of nourishment; when energy levels reach zero, an 
individual dies. Also, ages increase until they reach the maximum possible life span, 
then natural death occurs. Each individual in ALGAE is called 'ALgent '. Barriers 
are initially placed in their living space and the distribution changes over the time to 
constrict their movement. But in this current setting, we remove the barriers from 
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the environment, because our emphasis is the impact of food resources on ALgents' 
survival, and limiting the percentage of barriers in the environment does have an 
impact on the group's behaviour change. 
All behaviors discussed indicate that the two species compete for resources to 
survive. As the population evolves, the distribution of resources changes over time. 
We examine a population of artificial chromosomes (AChromosomes) which present 
each ALgent Gi in both species, as below: 
Ci= [SP,SL, VF,MD,AS,ML,AC,AA,AL,EF],i = {0,1}. 
We examine a population of AChromosomes which present each ALgent i as 
different species, as Table 6.1.: 
Gene Description Bit Site Gene Description Bit Site 
SP SPecies type 0 ML Motion Loss 9 
SL Life Span 1-2 AC Action Choice 10-12 
VF Vision Field 3-4 AA Attack Ability 13-14 
MD Motion Direction 5-6 AL Attack Loss 15-16 
AS Action Speed 7-8 EF Food Efficiency 17-18 
Table 6.1: 19-bit chromosome descriptor 
ALGAE incorporates the genetic algorithm (GA) for a population of chromo-
somes (bit strings representing organism characteristics) to evolve and reproduce the 
fittest chromosomes. During any reproduction process, parent chromosomes perform 
single point cross-over, bit-flip mutation, and inversion. The fitness function selects 
the most fit individual, whose genes are carried forward in the evolutionary time-
frame. A fitness value or score is assigned to each solution, representing the abilities 
of an individual to 'compete'. The individual with the optimal (or near optimal) 
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fitness score is sought. We further define fitness as survivability. Individuals in a 
population compete for resources and mates, and those who cannot survive are not 
fit, in the evolutionary sense, so will become extinct. This process iterates over a 
number of generations given by user's selection. The result is a chromosome com-
prising the 'best' genes which have evolved to foster survival fitness through the two 
species evolutionary process. 
In ALGAE, we consider the following aspects, such as living space, food re-
sources, competition, behaviour patterns and preferences, and physical status. The 
details are discussed below: 
a. Artificial Environment ( AEnvironment) is defined as a search space designed 
in a 2D field, a rectangular region symmetric to the center, for directional 
movement toward a desired object. 
b. Assume resources exist in the AEnvironment composed of n x m grids (here 
we use 51 x 51), randomly distributed and which are renewable. Plant food is 
available to increase energy, located available in the exploring area. 
c. Competition is also intrinsic in an AEnvironment. Individuals attack the other 
species based on Attack Ability (AA). They have a certain amount of energy 
which is lost by movement (Motion Loss, ML), and attack (Attack Loss, AL). 
Species also gain energy by consumption of food (Food Efficiency, EF). Food 
is assigned simulating natural law with corresponding food value and vital-
ity. Each individual is a gene disseminator, an intelligent individual, facing a 
complex environment, so choosing suitable adaptive behavior is very impor-
tant. Appropriate behavior ensures genetic replication and thus evolution. To 
achieve survival and multiplication, the species member undertakes migration, 
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looks for food, exhibits breeding behavior. Also, in order to ensure the popu-
lation's evolution, ALGAE programs in mutual attacking behavior which can 
eliminate the genetically inferior individual. 
e. Individual behavior patterns and preferences are programmed as movement 
modes and action modes into their genes, as follows: 1) ALgents can only mate 
with local individuals within their 'action field'. Each individual complies with 
its own Action Choice (AC) as preference to choose behaviours: look for food, 
attack/defend, or mate. In the hypothetical AL world, motion characteristic 
emulates biological drives. 2) Motion Direction (MD) choice, according to the 
GA aspect of ALGAE, determines that transition motions are all caused by 
corresponding instinctive (genetically determined) decisions. 3) the Action 
Choice gene mimics biological behaviour priorities. 
f. Physical status such as lifespan (SL) is also genetically determined. When a 
certain age is reached, or energy entropy reaches a threshold, ALgent dies. 
Individual age increases along with the generation increase, surpassing the 
lifespan, ending in natural death. Regarding the (biological) initial age, in 
order to simulate the initial population subject to the process of evolution, 
individual age is assigned as a random number pl us the biological minimum 
age (SLMJN ). Similarly, the initial biological energy available is stated as 
Energy = 70 + random(30) (maximum energy is 100) to ensure a level of 
individual energy consumption during the initial migration. 
All behaviors above indicate that the two species compete for resources to sur-
vive. As the population evolves, the distribution of resources changes over time. 
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SP: The first bit, indexed as 'O' shown in Table G.1, represents the SPecies type, 
where each type has different preference: 
ca preference 'l' stands for 'selfish' agent, coloured in blue; 
• whereas 'O' stands for 'altruistic' agent, coloured in pink. 
When the food resource is renewable plant, according to user's specification, 
resources level is set to regrow at certain rates until the maximum limit. A 
height threshold is specified which indicates minimum amount reserved needed 
to maintain plants' healthy growth. If the height level of plants is too low, 
regrowing rate is significant slow which can lead to resources paucity. At 
renewable plants' setting, 'altruistic' ALgent collects food resources in an en-
vironmental way, specifically, when height level is beyond threshold, otherwise, 
'altruistic' type chooses not to consume resources until they reach the thresh-
old. On the other hand, 'selfish' ALgent collects resources regardless of plant's 
regrowing status, as long as any plant exists. 
When the food resource is non-renewable honey, the resource only contains 
two stage: exist or finished. Both ALgent type 'l' and 'O' pursue honey in the 
same way to fetch it when it exists. 
SL: Index 1-2 bits stand for 'Life Span'. 
Age = SLmin +SL; 
in the initial setting, minimim lifespan, SLmin, is set as 50. Age's range is 
between minimum lifespan and its value add 'SL' maximum value 4. 
VF: The next 2 bits describe 'Vision Field' (VF). VF size is set as the length of 
radius, range from 1 to 4. This describes a sector area with certain radius 
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length. 
MD: After setting up the radius of vision field, the next 2 bits are 'Motion Direction' 
(MD). MD gives the moving direction angles which covers 90, 180, 270, or 360 
degrees, see Figure 6.1 
a. MD: 00 - 90 degrees b. MD: 01 - 180 degrees 
c. MD: 10 - 270 degrees d. MD: 11 - 360 degrees 
Figure 6 .1: Motion direction coverage sector graph 
AS: The 7-8 sequence specify individual's 'Action Speed' when moving. Each step, 
an agent can move the distance between 1 to 4. 
ML: Motion Loss is described in bit 9, which reflects various level of energy loss 
during each exploration movement. Motion inevitably consumes energy, ac-
cording to natural law, yet such energy consumption cannot become a decisive 
reason by which a species survives or perishes. When individuals move, the 
energy consumption will be related to and associated with 'ML' gene, that is 
Loss = ML+ min. The minimum movement energy loss is given by user's 
69 
specification. 
AC: The next 3 bits, indexed 10 to 12, describe each agent's behaviour preference as 
'Action Choice' (AC). In this action sequence, the first bit, Food Preference 
(FP), determines if this agent would search for food resources first when it 
is 'O', or after interaction with other agents when it is '1 '. We number the 
interaction choice with other agents as following: mate is 'a', and fight is 'b'. 
The last two bits in the AC is named 'Interaction Preference' (IP). IP gives 
each agent's preference of interaction with others. Specifically, '00' is choice 
'a'; '01' is choice 'b'; '10' is choice 'a' then 'b'; '11' is choice 'b' then 'a'. 
AA: In each behaviour interaction with other agents, agents lose various amounts 
of energy. During combat, the 'Attack Ability' is critical to determine the 
the fight result afterwards, described in 2 bits sequence from 13 to 14. The 
ability to attack affirms it is important whether this living thing can survive. 
In Nature, species have power and size; for instance, even if the tiger is injured 
he cannot easily be defeated by a rabbit. Here, we do not include a multitude 
of living things, but only two hypothetical species, who do not have the natural 
power which large numbers might generate. ALGAE simulates natural species, 
where concrete behaviour has direct correspondence with inherited genes. As 
in Nature, victory in conflict determines survival. The principle is explained 
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as follows. If individual i has an attack capability stronger than individual j, 
then i wins. In an attack process, the energy of striking power is the most 
important. Individual i has a striking power as computed below: 
Attacki = energyi(t) + AAi * r * 20/4, 
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where r is a random float number between 0 and 1. That is, an individual's 
striking power is influenced by its current energy and how large of a fraction 
of energy boost of 20 determined by its 'Attacking Ability'. 
AL: 'Attack Loss' varies from 1 to 4, given as 2 bits sequence from 15 to 16. 
AL gives the energy loss during a fight. After the fight, both 'i and j loss 
energy, but the quantity is different. In order to simulate real biological attack 
beha~ior, each individual loses a random fraction value of the 'Attack Loss' 
stochastically, and this individual has a further energy loss of 40, as follows: 
Energy(t + 1) = Energy(t) - AL* r - 40. 
EF: 'Food Efficiency' is represented as the last 2 bits, which defines agent's food 
absorbing efficiency, scale 1 to 4: 
Energy(t+ 1) = Energy(t) - e * EF, 
where e is 'energy-gain-from-food', given as basic energy provided by resources. 
Amount of energy each ALgent gained is determined by its own observation, 
'EF'. 
Figure G.2 illustrates the initialized ALGAE. Two type of agents are presented: 
type 1 agents ('selfish') coloured in blue, and type 0 agents ('altruistic') coloured 
in pink. Figure G.2(a) presents green plants as regrowing resources. Figure G.2(b) 
states a non-renewable food resource (honey), represented as orange leaves. 
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(a) Renewable plant resources (b) Non-renewable honey resources 
Figure 6.2: ALGAE world 
6.2.2 Pseudocode and Run Process 
In ALGAE, the program establishes the artificial world (AWorld) environment pa-
rameters, comparable to biological evolutionary pressure. Using a graphical interface 
dynamic demonstration, it records the evolutionary processes for each generation 
(which survives). The system operation follows some basic steps and establishes 
parameters in relation to the environment as follows Algorithm 4. 
The program iterates to mimic generational evolution over lengthy time frames. 
Species members experience genetic variations throughout the process, and the sur-
vivors remain to reveal which specific genes adapted. Next, we examine how these 
survivors' genes correlate to produce successful adaptation. 
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Algorithm 4: ALGAE 
Initialize: AWorld environment, food resource, ALgent population; 
Energy= 70 +random (30); 
Age= 1; 
while generation number< maxium number €3 both species ALgents exist do 
ALgent act; 
if first action-choice =food then 
I 
fetch food; 
action-with-mate; 
else 
I 
action-with-mate; 
fetch-food; 
end 
move randomly; 
Age= Age+ 1; 
generation number += 1; 
death-check; · 
Update: environment, food resource, ALgent population; 
end 
6.3 ALGAE Simulation 
In this section, we describe a detailed ALGAE simulation\ developed using Netlogo 
(Wilensky, 1999). The goal for this experiment is to uncover the hidden relations 
among AGenes by using BN to analyze the datasets of survivors' AChrop-losomes. 
This experiment has an initial run to collect the survivor genes over all generations. 
This is the input for BAyesian Networks ANAlysis (BANANA) (Yan a,nd Cercone, 
2010a) to analyze. The ALGAE setup and experimental results are illustrated in 
the following. 
1 ALGAE is available for download at http://www. cse .yorku. ca/-lisayan/algae_code .nlogo. 
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6.3.1 Experiment Setup 
We first identify relevant environmental parameters which affect the species evo-
lutionary chances: population settings and resources settings. First, define the 
environment AWorld size as width 51 units by height 51 units, which provides life 
space or living territory. Next, in the population settings, the initial species pro-
portion indicates a population size of 100, which is a proportion of 5 percent in 
relation to the territory available. This setting provides ample room for migratory 
moyements and food seeking. The minimum lifespan is set as user's specification, 
for example 50, which indicates that species members have some chance to act and 
move in their virtual world for a reasonable period of time. Also a mutation rate 
is set up as 0.05, and crossover rate as 60 percent. Both are carried into this sim-
ulated AWorld also. It allows for unpredictable results in gene recombination. The 
maximum g~neration number for the total run is set as 160. The initial population 
shows even distribution of 50 individual entities of each species, coloured red and 
blue, and positioned in AWorld. This positioning is purely random, and remains 
random for .each generation run. 
Last, resources settings can be specified in two groups: a) renewable plant re-
sources; b) non-renewable honey resources. The initial setup for the ALGAE run 
(Figure G.:3) states the parameters for plants to grow. In Figure G.~3, for example, 
we give a threshold height as 5, and maximum height 10. When the plant height 
is beyond the threshold, plants have a fast growth rate as 70 percentage; or, plants 
have a slow growth rate of 30 percentage when it falls under the threshold. 
In Figme 6.4, we establish the initial proportion of non-renewable food: honey. It 
is set as 40 percent of the living space. Each honey consumption gives an individual 
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ALCAE Simulation 
Figure 6.3: ALGAE Interface with renewable plant resources 
energy reward of 4. All types of resources allow energy level to reach the maximum 
level of 100. 
A.LGAES1mula.Uon 
Figure 6.4: ALGAE interface with non-renewable honey resources 
6.3.2 Experimental Results and Analysis 
In this evolutionary process, two groups of living entities compete to survive. After 
undergoing the simulated evolutionary process, the distribution can be seen in Fig-
ure 6.5 and Figure 6.f.), which presents the final stage of ALGAE simulation of two 
types of resources settings respectively. 
In Figure G.5, renewable plants provide resourceful energy supply for all ALgents. 
In this whole process, both type 0 and type 1 ALgents reach a settled amount of 
population while fetching resources. In the next section, we reveal the common 
inter-relations among all survivors' gene descriptors. 
In Figure G.6, limited resources constraints ALgents' survival conditions. After 
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Fi'gure 6.5: ALGAE final stage in growing plants world 
30 steps of exploration in the environment, population of type 1, coloured in blue, 
drops significantly when few resources (less then 13) remain; whereas, population 
of type 0, coloured in pink, is eliminated from this evolutionary process. Grey leaves 
denotes food sources consumed, orange leaves denote fresh food resources. However, 
given the limitation of resources and random setting for behaviors, both types have 
equal chance to last to the end of survival. In the next section, we analyze what 
insigh,ts are revealed as common inter-relations among all survivors' gene descriptors 
in each exploration, which promote ALgents to survive to the very last as best fit. 
6.3.3 Fittest Gene Discussion 
In this ALGAE .process, we examine the species evolution and gene expression. Af-
ter running a number of experiments, we want to know which genes account for 
an outstanding/surviving individuals? Take the runs illustrated in Figure (),!} and 
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Figure 6.6: ALGAE final stage in honey world 
Figure G.6 as examples. The final positions of surviving ALgents shown are quite 
different. The evolutionary assumption is that less fit ALgents are, less prone to sur-
vival in a harsh environment with other competitor species, and disappeared from 
the gene pool. We conclude the following characteristics of the optimal gene/indi-
vidual that indicate the fittest survival: 
• Lifespan is large in the fittest genes. 
• Vision Field of vision is maximized in the fittest genes. 
• Action Choice suggests that food resources searching first to increase the en-
ergy level before consumption promotes survival. So the fittest genes allow 
individuals to approach the same type of entity and obtain food resources. 
• Attack capability is high in fittest gene. 
• Low attack energy consumption promotes fitness. 
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We conducted ten different ALGAE trials and obtained ten separate datasets. 
It is shown that these ten different experimental results produced the ten different 
best genes over the same initial resource and population settings, see Table G.2. 
This table shows that the results differ from trial to trial. Because the genetic 
Trial NO. Survivor Type Best Genes 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
5 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
6 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
7 0 0011000000101000111 
8 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
9 1 1001101100000000011 
10 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Table 6.2: 10 Trials Fitness Gene Profiles Datasets Logs 
algorithm itself is a stochastic algorithm, any result is interesting because it reflects 
the pressures on genotypes over time, under variable conditions. An interesting 
question arises. Although each trial produced a 'best' gene, why are they different 
from each other? Another question is how and what can we learn from each of 
the 'best' genes? A third question is what is the similarity among the ten trials 
which could bring forward the best individual chromosome as a surviving remnant 
of evolution? 
Table 6.2 shows variation in the composition of each best gene. Each gene has 
entirely different and unique attributes. ALGAE randomizes the chromosomes for 
each run, as well as certain environmental factors such as population distribution in 
relation to resources. What is interesting is that not every gene has optimal alleles 
or gene bits, so it is clear that survival fitness is not a question of having the best 
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gene or chromosomes, or having proximity to resources. Rather it is the combination 
of genes that remain in the gene pool of a generation which is most significant to 
survival and adaptation. Evolutionary pressure, that is, the degree of harshness and 
difficulty in the struggle to survive, can be severe, such as, Figure 6.6 shows that the 
total number of final stage survivors for that run is only two. Nevertheless, ALGAE 
identifies the best chromosome for those who survive. One type of ALgent tends to 
dominate qne run, and this reflects the genetic fitness of the population in terms of 
its genetic features. The best genes are carried forward, and this is consistent with a 
Darwinian concept. In the next section, we present Bayesian Network learning from 
survivors' chromosomes to illustrate what we can learn about gene contributions to 
survival from ALGAE. 
6.4 Bayesian Networks structure representation of Evo-
lutionary Process 
We create a topological structure BN to see the implicit connections among AGenes. 
ALGAE is a dynamic process based on GA, so the 'survivors' genes' change with 
each run. Our interest lays on why those survivors have proven to possess the 
fittest/best genes in the AWorld. The underlying reasons can be discovered using a 
BN. 
Given a set of variables and a dataset composed of all these variables' values, the 
problem is how to build a structure to present the connections among the variables. 
This structure learning process needs to select the arcs between them and estimate 
the parameters. Developing a structure gives a visual presentation to understand 
what underlies the knowledge or what attributes are correlated. However, to include 
80 
l I ' 
all the information from the data into the structure, yet to keep the structure simple 
and condensed with only critical information, is going to result in a trade-off. The 
two main approaches are used to learn structure in BNs: the constraint-based and 
the score-based approaches. In this section, we use the E-algorithm (Yan, 2003) to 
construct a Bayesian Network representation for ALGAE data. 
6.4.1 Independence Test 
Given the sample data of ALGAE, we want to know whether there is an association 
between the 'Vision Field' levels and the type of Species, or both types of species in 
attack motion differ in their energy loss. This type of question is the x2-test designed 
to solve (Pearson, 1900). This section, we present a simple example to illustrate how 
to conduct x2-test to identify the independence between characteristics in ALGAE. 
We take 'Species type' and 'Motion Direction' two variables as an example. This 
2 x 4 contingency table (see Table G.:3) presents the observed frequericies of MD value 
and Species types from one trial's ALGAE data. 
MD'l' MD'2' MD'3' MD'4' Total 
Type 0 389 50 2158 5123 7720 
Type 1 561 455 300 5773 7089 
Species num 950 505 2458 10896 14809 
Table 6.3: Observed contingency table 
Now, let us define our null hypothesis as follows: The number of species type 'O' 
and '1' in ALGAE survived due to their 'MD' value choice range 1to4 is independent 
of their species type. 
According to the null hypothesis, we can calculate the expected 2 x 4 contingency 
table (see Table 6.4) presents as follows: 
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MD'l' MD'2' MD'3' MD'4' Total 
Type 0 Ei E2 E3 E4 7720 
Type 1 Es E6 E1 Es 7089 
Species num 950 505 2458 10896 14809 
Table 6.4: Expected contingency table 
Under the hypothesis that two variables' classifications are independent, that is 
we would expect the proportion of type '0' species has MD '1' is equal to the same 
type'O' with MD '2', '3', and '4'. So the following equations hold: 
Ei 
950 
Ei +Es 
E2 = E3 = _§__ = 7720 = 0.5213 505 2458 10896 14809 ' 
950, 
505, 
2458, 
10896. 
Solving the Eq. 6.1 for values of Ei,(i = 1, ... , 8), we obtain Table 6.5. 
MD'l' MD'2' MD'3' MD'4' Total 
Type 0 495 263 1281 5680 7720 
Type 1 455 242 1177 5216 7089 
Species num 950 505 2458 10896 14809 
Table 6.5: Expected frequencies on the assumption of independence 
(6.1) 
To compare the observed and expected frequencies, we calculate the x2 value 
using the following equation: 
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where Oi (i = 1, ... , 8) is the observed frequencies in Table 6.:3. The degree of 
freedom (di) of two variables in contingency table with r rows and c columns is 
computed as: 
df = ( r - 1) * ( c - 1). 
According to Species type and Motion Direction these two variables, the degree 
of freedom is 3. To assess the significance of the x2 value 1775.35, we check the x2 
table with df = 3. Given the confidence value a= 0.001, the corresponding value is 
16.2662. Our x2 value 1775.35 is much greater than 16.2662, which suggests that in 
less than 0.001 level of probability the null hypothesis is true. Thus, we reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that SP and MD is not independent. 
In the next section, we give a brief introduction to the Bayesian Network learn-
ing E-algorithm, which first conducts constraint independence tests using x2 test. 
Thereafter a MDL scoring method is performed to optimize the graphical structure. 
6.4.2 Bayesian Network Learning Algorithm: E-algorithm 
The key aspect of the structure learning problem is to construct a topology network 
from fully observable variables. This section provides an improved BN learning 
algorithm: the E-algorithm first proposed in Yan, 200;3 undertaken in relation to 
improving learning Bayesian Networks. The E-algorithm has been adapted to busi-
ness applic.ations, e.g., suggested business strategies that a business should choose, 
as reported in Ji et al., 2004; Yan et al., 2007. In Ji et al., 2005, the accuracy and 
efficiency of the :&algorithm has been established by comparing execution time of 
the E-algorithm against two established algorithms: I-MDL, 1-B&B-MDL. 
The following section briefly illustrates the E-algorithm. The E-algorithm com-
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bines both a constraint-based approach and a score-based approach, jointly apply-
ing the conditional independence (CI) test and minimum description length (MDL) 
metr.ic search. First, a small number of dependence tests are used to reduce the cal-
culation complexity and to restrict the feasible search space. Second, the improved 
MDL metric search boosts both time performance and efficiency of BN learning. 
a. Constraint-based approach: 
The constraint-based approach poses learning as a constraint satisfaction prob-
lem, which is more intuitive and follows the definition of a BN more closely. 
This method performs tests of CI on the data, and search for a network that 
is consistent with the observed dependencies and independencies (Heckerman, 
1995; Pearl, 1986; Cooper and. Herskovits, 1991). 
As a typical metric, CI is based on information flow in information theory, 
thus the mutual information of two variables X, Y is defined as Eq. G.2: 
"""""' p ( x' y) """""' I(X, Y) =?,; P(x, y) log P(x)P(y) = L...J P(x, y~I(x, y), (6.2) 
and conditional mutual information is defined as Eq. G.:~: 
"""""' P( x, y le) """""' I(X, YIC) = L...J P(x, y) log P(xlc)P(ylc) = L...J P(x, y)I(x, yic), 
x,y,c 
(6.3) 
where C is a conditional set of nodes, P denotes the instance frequency (prob-
ability) observed from a sample dataset. The mutual information can show 
if the two variables are dependent and if so, how close is their relationship. 
Hence, when I(X, YIC) is smaller than a certain threshold value c, we can say 
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that X is independent of Y given the set C, or else X is independent of Y if 
C is the empty set. So we can deduce if there is a connection between two 
variables in view of the mutual information. 
Here, the threshold value c can be given based on expert knowledge, alterna-
tively, there is another similar method, the x2 test (Qiang et al., 2002), which 
is based on a statistical hypothesis to estimate a connection between two vari-
ables. Given a degree of confidence CJ, a connection between two variables 
can be deduced by t-value(threshold) which is generated by x2 test. In our 
case, if the connection value I is greater than or equal to t-value, then X is 
·independent of Y, which implies that there is no direct connection between 
these two variables. Otherwise, if the connection value I is less than t-value, 
then X is dependent of Y, which means that an arc connects X and Y in the 
resultant network. 
b. Score-based approach: 
The score-based method is to define a score function that evaluates how well 
the dependencies in a structure match the data, and search for the simplest 
structure which also maximizes the score. In the set of feasible solutions, 
a recursive search can be used to find an optimal structure that satisfies the 
criteria. A scoring function commonly used to learn a BN is the log-likelihood, 
which is simply the log of the likelihood function, that is, Eq. GA: 
n 
l(Xlg, 09 ) log IJp(Xillli, g, fJ9 ) (6.4) 
i=l 
n L logp(Xillli, g, 09 ), (6.5) 
i=l 
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where ()9 is a parameter of the structure gin a dataset X which also represents 
all the variables, and lli is the parents set of node Xi. The log-likelihood 
is easier to analyze than the likelihood, because the logarithm turns all the 
products into sums. Therefore, according to Eq. GA, we have Eq. G.5. 
There are a couple of important points to note about the log-likelihood. The 
log-likelihood increases linearly with the size of a dataset. The higher scoring 
networks are those where a node and its parents are highly correlated. The net-
work structure that maximizes the likelihood is often fully connected. Adding 
a node into a network always increases the log-likelihood. This deficiency of 
the log-likelihood score is not desired. Thus, a score that makes it harder to 
add arcs is necessary. In other words, we would like to penalize structures 
with too many arcs. One possible formulation of this idea is called the MDL 
score (Suzuki, 1993). The MDL score is a compromise between fit to data 
and model complexity. Adding a variable as a parent causes the log-likelihood 
term to increase, but so does the penalty. There will be an arc addition if its 
increase to the likelihood is worth it. The detailed MDL scoring function will 
be explained in the following section. 
The space of Bayesian networks is a combinatorial space, consisting of an ex-
ceeding large number of structures. This problem is combinatorially complex; both 
approaches have their limitations. The general idea of the E-algorithm is quite 
straightforward. First, the constraint based tests are performed to get an initial 
network to consider, which reduces the search space. Then, a metric score function 
is used to find a matching structure which has the best motivated score. 
The E-algorithm considers the BN structure learning as a connection elimination 
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process starting from a fully connected graph Go among all the variables. It features 
three elements: 1) order-0 independence tests are used to delete weak connections 
and obtain a graph G1 ; 2) order-1 conditional independence x2 tests, which only 
appears in the "~-form", are conducted and simplify G1 to G2. The definition of 
"~-form" is as follows: 
Given an arc between two nodes Xi and Xj in BN structure g, if there is another 
path connecting them which only includes one extra node Xk , we call this acyclic 
subgraph an order-1 "~-form" (Figure 6.7); if this path includes two extra nodes, 
we call this subgraph order-2 "~-form". 
Figure 6.7: ~-form 
This process reduces the search space for scoring possible structures. 3) The 
E-algorithm then directly evaluates the structure MDL scores~ Eq. G.6 defines a 
score that evaluates how well the dependencies in a structure match the data, and 
we can search for a structure that maximizes the score (Qia.ng et al., 2002; Suzuki, 
1993). 
MDL(g,X) f,H(i,g,X) + k~) logn, (6.6) 
i=l 
n 
H(i,g,X) L-p(Xi logp(XilIIi, g), (6.7) 
i=l 
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where MDL(g, X) is the description length of graph g for overall data variables X, 
H(i, g, X) describes the empirical entropy of each node i and its sum stands for the 
overall structure fitness to the observed data, and k(g) is the description for the 
complexity of nodes (each node i has the number Vi values, j is a parent node of i, 
j = [1, i - 1]), as follows: 
n 
k(g) = L k(i, g), 
i=l 
i-1 
k(i,g) =(vi - 1) L Vj. 
j=l 
(6.8) 
(6.9) 
As can be seen, the problem of learning BN becomes a search problem for a 
structure with MDL metric. A recursive search is applied to the MDL-based search 
procedure. This search examines all possible local changes in the set of parent nodes, 
revealing that the cost of those evaluations is too high for massive dataset~. 
The E-algorithm, described in Algorithm 5, takes numeric data input from AL-
GAE's output of the suvivors' genetic data. The learning process is to learn n x n 
binary matrix G, to represent connections among all the nodes, where '1' in the 
coresponding entry indicates an edge between these two nodes, and 'O' indicates no 
connection. A fully connected graph is generated as an initial step, where all the 
corresponding entries are given value '1' in the matrix for graph G. Then, com-
pute the conditional mutual information in light of Eq. ().;) to remove any invalid 
edge by x2-test according to a given degree of confidence level <J = 0.001. For each 
node Xi, sort its candidate parents Ili nodes as ascending ordering by their mutual 
information; then search to find a Ili with the minimum MDL score and confirm 
the local optimized structure of Xi. Update all the nodes, until the minimum MDL 
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score is reached for the whole structure, and output graph matrix G. We test the 
E-algorithm in a benchmark ALARM Network dataset, and it demonstrates that it 
is efficient, valid and produces high accuracy for learning BN structures (Yan, 2003; 
Ji et al., 2005; Yan and Cercone, 2010a). 
6.4.3 Result Discussion 
We reimplement a Bayesian Network structure learning software BANANA in Mat-
lab, (see Appendix B), where a graphical representation is constructed using the 
E-algorithm to reveal the inter-connections among data. We use randomly cho-
sen 10 trial datasets from ALGAE as input, with total size of 68504 data entries. 
BANANA provides a graphical representation in Figure G.8 to reveal the inter-
connections among the genetic descriptors among these 10 trial simulations in AL-
GAE. The program runs in Matlab on Mac OS X, with Processor 2.8GHz Intel 
Core i7, Memory 8GB 1067MHz. The runtime for a single run is approximately 28 
minutes. 
The BN structure indicates the formula for the rule of survival: relationship 
(edges) between the genetic characteristics (nodes) will determine who lives and 
who does not. The ability to act rapidly (AS), obtain food (FP) or reproduce (IP) 
are related to ability and skill to move (MD). Species type (SP), lifespan (SL) and 
the visual field in the environment (VF) determines the motion direction (MD). In 
a competitive world, the ability to defend and resist annihilation is represented by 
the ability to attack (AA), and limited by entropy of energy (AL). This is tied to the 
power to move and act (MD, AS) and limited by loss of motion (ML). Energy can 
be replenished by food resources (EF), which have a scaled level of uptake efficiency. 
All these abilities are genetically determined in the ALGAE. 
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Algorithm 5: E-ALGORITHM 
Input: numeric data from ALGAE; 
Output: structure G. matrix; 
begin 
Initialize: 
G: fully connected graph matrix; 
conj idencelevel : a = 0.001; 
Step 1: mutual information test; 
for each node i do 
for each i's neighbor node j do 
if mutual-info(i, j) = true then 
I remove edge i ,j; 
else 
I sort parent list Ili according to mutual-info ascendingly ; 
end 
end 
end 
Step 2: CI test, remove redundant edges; 
for each node i do 
for each i's neighbor node j do 
if CI-test(i, j, a) = true then 
I remove edge i ,j; 
end 
end 
end 
Step 3: MDL test, remove redundant edges; 
for each node i do 
for each i's neighbor node j do 
if MDL-score(i, j) = true then 
I remove edge i ,j; 
end 
end 
end 
end 
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(1) ;sP: SPecies type; (2) SL: Life Span; (3) VF: Vision Field; 
(4) MD: Motion Direction; (5) AS: Action Speed; 
(6) .ML : Motion Loss; (7) FP: Food Preference; (8) IP: Interaction Preference; 
(9) AA: Attack Ability; (10) AL : Attack Loss; (11) EF : Food Efficiency; 
Figure 6.8: BN structure of ALGAE genetic characteristics 
Chance primarily determines which genes are present at the start of a run, but 
it is evolutionary fitness which determines actual survival. BANANA reveals the 
hidden structure behind this fitness of successful genotypes. In Figure G.8, the seven 
edge connections in red are the core structure for this ALGAE setting. It shows that 
motion and action are most important in that they impact other abilities that are 
inheritable and promote evolutionary fitness. Of additional importance are species 
type and lifespan (SP, SL). These would play a role for any organism, so in the 
AWorld they are to be expected to be fundamental. What is notable in this experi-
ment is that these characteristics seem to be both necessary and sufficient to ensure 
fitness. Under the given. constraints, these genes emerge repeatly until dominance of 
one species occurs. The combination of such genes, revealed by Bayesian analysis, 
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give us insight into evolutionary processes. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we demonstrate the structure of inter-connections among agents 
strategies in a competitive environment. First, we develop a competitive multiagent 
interaction platform: ALGAE. The process of simulated environment in ALGAE 
provides us to observe generations of genes evolving in an accelerated period. AL-
GAE also allows us to foresee the genetic recombination process and provide us 
insights into variations among group behaviors. Second, we develop BANANA us-
ing the E-algorithm to extract the Bayesian Network structure representation among 
agents strategies. BN reveals the hidden structure of relationships in ALgents be-
haviours, and provides us a visual representation of them. 
The experiment demonstrates that the reimplementation of BAN AN A in Matlab 
is robust. Testing BANANA in a real example enhanced the performance such that 
it learns effectively and robustly on a number of variables and connections. Applying 
the E-algorithm in a complete domain shows that it can learn the influence of factors 
to build policies in this complex environment and application. 
The principles of how a survivor adapts in evolution from either optimal an-
cestors or weak ones, and at what point the evolutionary process can be tilted to 
favor certain adaptive ones, needs further exploration. How we develop a ratio-
nal decision-making component for each ALgent, rather than mere random choice, 
needs further research. The knowledge revealed from Bayesian analysis need to 
be provided to each individual to allow actions to be chosen intelligently accord-
ing to various factors in the environment. Applying this knowledge (constraints) 
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which exists among various factors in the multiagent environment, allows an indi-
vidual ALgent to choose an optimal action and obtain a gain of equilibrium. Thus, 
ALGAE and BANANA have been shown to be useful applications to extend our 
understanding of MAL, where dependency exists among multiple factors which in-
fluence agent strategies. These applications suggest further research into artificial 
intelligence in terms of heritability and evolutionary processes. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future 
Research 
Our research examines the following questions: 
How can an agent perform robustly in the various types of multiagent 
environments, so that each agent can efficiently observe other agents 
behaviours, and learn from its observations in order to act (or adapt) 
effectively in the complex non-stationary environment? What is the 
macro-level phenomenon of the whole system, and how can this under-
standing of the phenomenon improve individual performance? 
Ultimately, through a learning period and a series of actions, agents can achieve 
top-ranked performance. 
In this dissertation, we present the importance of analyzing the structural prop-
erties in multiagent problems. In a non-stationary multiagent environment, each 
agent adapts to proceed towards its target. Each micro-level step in time may 
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present a different learning problem which needs to be addressed. However, struc-
tural properties constitute a holistic phenomenon along with the rational strategies 
of all players. In this chapter, we summarize our contributions and discuss some 
future research directions. 
7.1 Contributions 
We present the importance of analyzing the structural properties in multiagent 
problems. Multiagent research derives from two perspectives: learning and systems. 
In one aspect, multiagent learning research focuses on learning from an individual 
agent's past experience or modeling other agents' behaviors to improve performance. 
In the other aspect, research on multiagent system addresses particular problems 
from a system perspective, with more focus on a number of agents' interactions, and 
provides optimal solutions. However, in a non-stationary multiagent environment, 
each agent adapts to proceed towards its target. Each micro-level step in time 
may present a different learning problem which needs to be addressed. In this 
non-stationary environment, a holistic phenomenon forms along with the rational 
strategies of all players; we define this phenomenon as structural properties. In this 
dissertation, we present methods to extract some structural properties in multiagent 
problems. 
A multiagent environment can be classified as self-interested, cooperative, or 
competitive according to agents' goal. Here, a self-interested environment differs 
from a competitive, where all agents are not competing with others as a general-
sum game ~sin a competitive environment. Thus, we examine the structure from 
these three general multiagent environments: self-interested random graphical game 
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playing, distributed cooperative team playing, and competitive group competition. 
In each scenario, we analyze the structure in each environmental setting and demon-
strate a structure learned as a comprehensive representation: structure of players' 
action influence, structure of constraints in teamwork communication, and structure 
of inter-connections among strategies. This structure represents macro-level knowl-
edge arising in a multiagent system, and provides critical, holistic information for 
each problem domain. 
There are four contributions in our research. 
First, we present the importance of structure, a new yet vital point to tackle 
the problem of how agents perform robustly in various multiagent environments. 
We focus on understanding the common characteristics in multi-player games, more 
specifically, understanding the structure formed in a large number of agents in a 
multiagent system. The structure reveals characteristics in a multiagent system, 
which provides critical information for solving multiagent system problems. 
Second, after revealing the characteristics which exist within multi-player games, 
we further explore the structural connection exerting mutual influence between play-
ers' choices of actions in game playing. Much multiagent system and learning re-
search has been done from both machine learning and game theoretic perspectives. 
However, characterizing a multiagent system as a multi-player game, little research 
on how to abstract structure among players' actions has been conducted. In Chap-
ter 4, we provide a novel structure-learning algorithm, MDRLSA, to extract the 
action connections from graphical games. Knowing the influence between players' 
choice of action provides a compact representation for player's utility function, as 
well as reducing the search space for each player's learning process. MDRLSA can 
learn a good representation for games and MAS where there are sparse strong in-
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fluences in individual player payoff. 
Third, we analyze the importance of the structure of constraints in solving dis-
tributed team learning problem. We present the SE-Adaptive search algorithm and 
demonstrate in its application: the mobile ad hoc network domain. Communica-
tion among agents through connections in a network is a critical aspect in such a 
multiagent system. In a cooperative environment, agents communicate with neigh-
bours and achieve the goal of higher overall payoff. When exclusively acquiring 
information from neighbours, the time consumption increases exponentially to the 
scale of network inter-connection complexity. Our research exploits how to utilize 
the structure information while performing can improve the optimal exploration 
strategy in a cooperative environment, so that the time consumption and overall 
payoff achievement is balanced. In MANET, a group of cooperative agents explore 
in a distributed manner within limited time steps in a given environment to max-
imize the overall total payoff, with incomplete information of strategy payoff. In 
this setting, each agent explores to maximize the overall payoff, and moves toward 
equilibrium. However, how to use a lower level of optimization among agents to 
reach a higher overall payoff with limited time steps is a critical issue between the 
trade-off in exploration and exploitation. Our experiments demonstrate that, in 
a densely connected network, only a single agent's optimization can achieve 983 
of a two-agent optimization, although the difference of overall payoff is achieved by 
higher level optimization with a large trade-off in time consumption. Thus, knowing 
the structure of an agent's connections, it is helpful to choose an optimal strategy 
for overall performance within the time constraints. 
Last, we demonstrate the structure of inter-connections among agents strategies 
in a competitive environment. We develop a competitive multiagent interaction 
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platform: ALGAE. The process of simulating agent interaction within ALGAE 
provides us a way to observe generations of genes evolving in an accelerated period. 
ALGAE also allows us to foresee the genetic recombination process and provide 
us insights into variations among group behaviors. Then, we develop BAN AN A 
using the E-algorithm to extract the Bayesian Network structure representation 
among agents strategies. BN reveals the hidden structure of relationships in ALgents 
behaviours, and provides us a visual representation of them. This research presents 
the insight that the inter-connection among the characteristics of those agents with 
the best behavioural strategies to survive, where dependency exists among multiple 
factors which influence agent strategies. 
7.2 A Unified Multiagent Framework 
This section summarizes the insights gained from examing structural properties and 
evolutionary computing. We propose a novel multiagent environmental description, 
and a system process to describe the interaction among agents. This design differs 
from the description in Chapter 2. This new unified framework includes more func-
tional features for each agent to perform adaptively in dynamic environments with 
guidance from macro-level influence of structures, as well as micro-level individual 
learning and modeling. The macro-level influence forms as a holistic phenomenon of 
mutual influence, constraints or strategies, while all the players perform intelligently 
in this environment. These structural connections can play crucial role where the 
collective intelligent features appear. 
Framework Description 
Given an environment E, n number of agents Ag = Ag1 , Ag2 , ... , Agn, (n ~ 1) 
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act towards their goals G1, ... , Gn. In this process, each agent Agi, i = {1, 2, ... , n}, 
explores E and learns through its experience. In order to achieve its individual goal 
Gi, agent Agi need to learn how to co-adapt with other agents, while its environment 
E changes over time. Under the dynamic environment, with unknown factors arising 
from other agents' learning process, we give the following formal description for this 
learning process in such a dynamic environment: 
• Agi is represented as an entity with a set of intrinsic information, called 
A chromosome: 
- rules; 
- experience; 
- preference; 
- self-stage: {position/location, wealth, energy, constraints} 
This list of code of Achromosome is a compact stage for encoding information, 
which is a carrier for an agent to store and retrieve the learned knowledge for 
its planned action. We adopt thi~ idea of using coded information (such as a 
chromosome) to represent the knowledge of Agi. However, the structure does 
not have to be a list, but could be a network structure with these properties 
as nodes. 
• Decision-making component DMi: 
- priority (ranking factors); 
- rewards comparison; 
future influence / impact; 
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/ 
- knowledge known; 
(7.1) 
This equation refers that the decision making D Mi for agent Agi depends on a 
weighted combination w of its current stage Ci, future influence/impact Fi and 
its past experience (or knowledge known) Pi. Current stage C is composed of 
action priorities and reward estimate. 
Other sub-components compute a Nash equilibrium decision, for example: 
- minimax-Q; 
- coalition modeling. 
• E = {e1,e2, ... ,em},ei = {lleill,Zabeli}, lleill is the content information de-
scribed for the ith environment factor, and labeli refers to. this factor ei is 
hidden (labeli = 0), or is revealed (labeli = 1). (The initial Ei, randomly set 
a binary value for each label over the time steps.) 
• Stage of agents at time t: S = { sl, s~, .. , s~}: each stage s~ = { i, kf, dmf, ... , 
staten, k! is the knowledge held by agent i at time t; dm~ is the decision 
making component of agent i at time t. 
• Goal G = {gf}; 
Compared to game theory, this description is a learning process, not only solving 
a game. What there is to learn is a decision-making function which combines the 
learned knowledge, current rewards, and future estimate. This new framework dif-
fers from the common description, and operates differently in a multiagent learning 
100 
T' I' 
l I I 
environment. We quantify these learning dynamics in a multiagent learning prob-
lem. This non-stationary learning multiagent system can be seen as an 'open-close' 
system, see Figure 7 .1. 
Ope 
{ 
Feedback '\ 
Positiv~ !egative 
Activation Inhibition 
ose 
<:'super.;igent Cel~ 
Figure 7.1: 'Open-Close' system diagram 
In future research, we will explore how to utilize the holistic structural informa-
tion to improve problem solving in multiagent systems. 
7.3 Future Research 
As early as 1951, fictitious play as the first learning algorithm was proposed to com-
pute equilibria in games, and there have been numerous proposals since, regarding 
learning techniques in stochastic games. The MAL and MAS research has produced 
some inspiring results, yet, it is important to examine the foundations of MAL, 
and consider some relevant questions. What question exactly is MAL addressing? 
What is the goal for MAS? What is there to learn in stochastic games? What is 
the optimal design for MAS? What are the criteria by which to measure answers to 
these questions? How can we evaluate the success of learning rules and a system? 
We further ask: do the agents know the stochastic game, including the stage 
game and the transition probability? More specifically, the information regarding 
the following: stochastic stages, transition probabilities, specific actions at each 
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stage, actions available according to the agents, transparent (or not) for all the 
agents stages, action/strategies, rewards, and so on. These all are rather important 
factors in the whole process of agent learning. In general, this learning process 
can be classified as known or unknown games, observable, partially observable, 
or unobservable play. Furthermore, in broader settings, there is more to learn, 
including but not limited to learning opponents' strategies or developing the agent's 
own strategy for proceeding effectively against competitors. 
In a multiagent system, the agents can be controlled in a centralized or decentral-
ized manner. Is there a diagram suitable for a moment-to-moment situation? What 
is the tipping point for this shift from one state to another? Do the agents com-
municate with all their neighbors as necessary? How do we design a self-organized 
multiagent system to perform tasks? And how does an observed or learned macro-
level phenomenon provide knowledge for micro-level individual agent learning? 
In the literature, for the known, fully observable games, there are two aspects to 
learn in this restricted setting. One is that an agent learns the opponents' strategies 
as a model, so the agent can devise a best (or at least "good") response, (also 
known as "model-based" learning), for example, fictitious play (Brown, 1951). The 
other one is that an agent can learn a strategy of its own which does well against 
the opponents, without explicitly learning the opponents' strategies, (also known as 
"model-free" learning), for example, Q-learning (Watkins, 1989). 
Open issues for multiagent learning research remain. Multiple agents act jointly 
in a common environment to achieve their own agenda, through interaction, either 
cooperatively or in competitive with one another. Issues of scalability, adaptive 
dynamics, and communication require further exploration. 
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7.3.1 Scalability 
Scalability is an endemic problem for multiagent learning and multiagent systems. 
Multiagent systems involve multiple agent behaviors to achieve a common goal. 
Thus, the search space can grow exponentially according to the number of agents 
and the complexity of agent behavior. The evaluation criteria for learning methods 
should be standardized with respect to their scalability. In a general-sum learn-
ing process, especially with partially observed stochastic games, research usually 
involves studies in two-agent scenarios, with two or three actions for each agent. 
When scaled up to include more agents, current multiagent learning methods are 
unlikely to work in practice. A new multiagent framework will be required to incor-
porate diverse multiagent learning techniques with multiagent system designs. 
7.3.2 Adaptive Dynamics 
Due to the small changes caused by agents, multiagent systems can result in unpre-
dictable global, emergent effects. How does an agent in the system recognize this 
phenomenon and proceed to discover an .optimal strategy with the presence of such 
emergent effects? In a particular task, a holistic perspective of the environment 
should be learned. This holistic information can be stationary, given the particular 
problem settings. For example, the structural connections among the players can 
deviate how a game plays significantly. Providing such macro-level system-specific 
knowledge for agents can give important guidance to enable one individual to make 
more accurate predictions in this adaptive dynamic environment. 
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7.3.3 Communication 
Communication is a principal means to effectively and immediately improve perfor-
mance, and help agents accomplish their tasks. However, it can markedly increase 
the computation within the exploration space. The interaction can help complete 
tasks through passing or sharing information. However, it can also increase the 
complexity rapidly, in proportion to the number of agents and their idiosyncratic 
behaviors. 
To date, much research on multiagent communication has been conducted from 
two perspectives: direct communication and indirect communication. Direct com-
munication is a way for an agent to inform other agents about past experience, which 
can effectively improve team performance; methods include blackboards (posting 
and modifying information), and messages. Notably, reinforcement learning meth-
ods have presumed that the agents have access to a joint policy table to which each 
agent can contribute. Another perspective, indirect communication uses a third 
party, such as location or direction marking in the environment to pass information 
to others. Most indirect communication is inspired from social insects, such as ants, 
who utilize pheromones to mark trails, and bees send waggle dancing signals to lead 
others. One agent broadcasts the information in the environment, and the others 
can utilize and exploit it. 
Yet, in a multiagent system, (just like any social system), communication is 
restricted by the environment. Some researchers claim that unrestricted communi-
cation in effect brings the multiagent system back to a single-agent system (Stone 
and Veloso, 2000). Thus, how to define the level of communication among agents 
and allow agents to communicate according to adaptation in the environment is still 
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a open question which needs to be addressed. 
7.3.4 Evaluation 
In multiple agent interaction, each agent can constrain, adapt, evolve in the environ-
ment together with other agents; this diagram is not yet fully defined or understood 
in game theory, and brings in unknown complexity to computation. How we set up 
standard evaluation criteria for such complex systems and their learning process is 
still an open question. 
7.4 In Closing 
Seeking answers to these questions will bring us to many new research questions. 
Designing a robust multiagent learning system to solve real-time problems, such as 
emergency response, is a continuing challenge, but, exploring these questions can 
lead us to understand and develop more fully automatic multiagent systems. Fully 
automatic multiagent system can be more reflective of the ultimate goals in the field 
of Artificial Intelligence. 
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Appendix A 
Source Code: MDRLSA 
Multi-Descendent Regression Learning Structure Algorithm (MDRLSA) is a novel 
graphical structure learning algorithm for multiagent graphical games, using a re-
gression model to learn a player's utility function. 
Multi-Descendent Regression Learning Structure Algorithm 
II regression_learningStructure.m 
% Loading Data 
if nargin < 1 
% option 1: Load Data 
load('action_profile.mat'); 
load('A_profile.mat'); 
load('U_profile.mat') 
else 
% option 2: get matrix from reading game_file.txt file 
[U, A, action_profile] = fread_game_profile(game_file); 
end 
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tic 
% 
X action_profile; 
y U(:,1); 
m = length(y); 
% Add intercept term to X 
X = [ones(m, 1) X]; 
%get munber of players and each players 1 action number; 
[r, playerNum] = size(A); 
action_num = ceil(r-(1/playerNum)); 
%% Calculate the parameters from the normal equation 
theta_eq = []; 
for i = 1: size(U,2) 
y=U(:,i); 
theta_eq = [theta_eq, normalEqn(X, y)]; 
end 
% Di.splay normal equa.ti.on' s result 
fprintf('Theta computed from the normal equations: \n'); 
theta_eq 
%% Analyze the learning result 
epsilon= 1.0000e-5 
data= theta_eq(2:end,:); 
[m,n] = size(data); 
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% give n*n matrix: 0 indicates independent; 1 indicates related; 
graph_param = ones(n,n); 
temp_coef = zeros(n,n); 
for i = 1:n 
end 
a = data(:, i); 
for j = 1 :n 
end 
player_coef = a((j-1)*(m/n)+1:((j-1)*(m/n)~action_num)) 
a_norm = player_coef I mean(player_coef) 
temp_coef(j,i) = sum(abs(a_norm - ones(action_num,1))) 
if temp_coef(j,i) <epsilon 
end 
% flag unrelated player j & i as O; 
graph_param(j,i) = O; 
t = toe 
graph_param 
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Appendix B 
Source Code: BAN AN A 
BAN AN A is a Bayesian Network structure learning software, where a graphical 
representation is constructed using the E-algorithm to reveal the inter-connections 
among data. Here, ALGAE provides a genetic descriptors' data for BANANA. 
II HybridElearning.m 
function DG = HybridElearning( file , a) 
% thi.s hybrid E-algori.thm uses ALARM as benchmark to test BN lea.rni.ng 
algorithm; 
D = importdata(file); % 'genedecode __ 1.. csv' 
data = D.data; 
' % Input variable: a threshold of CI test a 
% a = 0. 001 ; 
% Data i.s a variable that saves our training database. 
LGObj = ConstructLGObj(data); % construct an object 
LG= struct(LGObj); 
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Dim LG.VarNumber; 
% Step 1.: Complete undirected gra.ph H 
DG =ones( Dim); % A directed graph 
for q = 1 :Dim 
DG( q,q ) = O; 
DG( q:end,q) = O; % only upper triangle is set for ls; 
end 
mutual_info = zeros(Dim, Dim); 
% Step2a., test every independence relationship at first, test the mutual 
in.formation. I(xi,xj) CI test 
for p = 1 : ( Dim - 1 ) 
end 
for q = ( p + 1): Dim 
end 
[MI,R,M] = Marginallyindependent_Mutualinforrnation( LGObj,p,q ); 
mutual_info(p, q) = MI; 
CI= CITest_ChiTwoVar( MI,R,M,a ); 
if CI == 1 
DG( p,q ) O; DG( q,p ) O; 
end 
% Step2b is optional for testing purpose; 
% Step2b-1, test every independence relationship, using Expectation 
Chi--square test 
chi2_testinfo = zeros(Dirn, Dim); 
for p = 1 : ( Dim - 1 ) 
110 
end 
for q = ( p + 1): Dim 
end 
[CI, chi2_testinfo(p,q)] = Chi2_Test( LGObj, p,q, a); 
if CI == 1 
DG( p,q ) O; DG( q,p ) O; 
end 
% Step3: 
%1 ·-·variable mutual inf ormatiou I (xi, xj z) CI test 
% if i->j, j->k a.nd i->k, test I(i,kj)? and I(j ,ki); 
for i = 1 : Dim 
J = find(DG(i,:)>O); 
for indexl = l:length(J) 
j = J(indexl); 
K = find(DG(j,:)>O); 
for index2 = 1: length(K) 
k = K(index2); 
if f ind(J == k) - 0 
% i->j, j->k and i->k exists, test info I(.i,kj)? 
[MI1 , R1, Ml ] = 
Conditionallyindependent_Mutualinformation( 
LG Obj , i , k , j ) ; 
CI1 = CITest_ChiTwoVar( MI1,R1,M1,a ); 
if CI1 == 1 % if MI <= 0.009 
DG( i,k ) = O; DG( k,i ) = O; 
end 
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I I I 
% test info I(j,ki)? 
[MI2,R2,M2 ] = 
Conditionallyindependent_Mutualinformation( 
LGObj,j,k,i); 
CI2 = CITest_ChiTwoVar( MI2,R2,M2,a ); 
if CI == 1 
DG( j ,k O; DG( k,j ) O· 
' 
end 
end 
end 
end 
end 
% Step4, using scoring test to evaluate DG; and remove the redundent 
representation; 
num = length(find(DG > 0)); 
count = O; 
flag = 1; 
% repeat Step4 a&b, until no further edges information changes. 
while flag == 1 
% step 4a: removing edge (ascending order of mutual info) 
% MDL scoring test all nodes: 
% score each node j outreached by node i, through deleting edge i·-»j 
% MDL scoring test ea.ch edge in DG and find the mininum score graph 
[indx, indy] = find(DG > O); 
struct_matrix = [indx indy]; 
map_info_matrix = mutual_info(find(DG>O)); 
% sorting orders of the edges a.scend.J.ngly according to mutual_in-fo 
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I, 
between these two nodes 
[new_map_info_matrix, IX] = sort(map_info_matrix); 
order_edge_matrix = struct_matrix(IX,:); 
[DG, remove_list] = score_descending_removedge(LGObj, DG, 
order_edge_matrix); 
% step 4b: adding edges deleted in step4a. rechecking (decending order 
ot mutual info) 
% By avoiding the sequence prob, the first time adding all the edges 
back and retesting the scores: 
% d.esending order of mutual_info for all the edges; 
% adding from the last deleted edge to the first one; 
% MDL scoring test all nodes: 
% score ea.ch node j outreached by node i, through deleting edge i->j 
% .MDL scoring test each edge ].n DG and find the mininum score graph 
remove_list_backup = remove_list; 
[DG, remove_list, add_list] = score_ascending_addedge(LGObj, DG, 
remove_list_backup); 
% step4c: sort edges according to the node ascending; 
edge_matrix = sortrows(order_edge_matrix); 
[DG, remove_list] = score_descending_removedge(LGObj, DG, edge_matrix); 
% step 4d: adding edges deleted in step4a rechecking (decending order 
of mutual info) 
% By avoiding the sequence prob, the first time adding all the edges 
back and testing again the scores: 
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end 
end 
% desending order of mutual_info for all the edges; 
% adding from the last deleted edge to the first one; 
% MDL scoring test al.1 nodes: 
% score each node j outreached by node i, through deleting edge i->j 
% MDL scoring test each edge in DG and find the mininum score graph 
remove_list_backup = remove_list; 
[DG, remove_list, add_list] = score_ascending_addedge(LGObj, DG, 
remove_list_backup); 
num_new = length(find(DG > O)); 
if num_new == num 
flag = O; 
else 
end 
num num_new 
coub.t = count + 1; 
114 
Appendix C 
ALGAE Manual 
ALGAE explores the relations of group population's competition survival. 
The ALGAE concept is inspired by the evolutionary epoch of Homo 
Sapiens where two divergent species exist, Type 0 and Type 1, and 
compete for resources in a primitive environment where survival is the 
primary biological goal. 
HOW ALGAE WORKS 
Type 0 and Type 1 migrate randomly around the landscape. Each step costs 
individuals energy, and they must eat food, 'veggie' or 'honey', in 
order to replenish their energy - when they run out of energy, they 
die. 
There are two main food variations to this model. 
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In the first variation, fix amount of food resources ('honey') is randomly 
located and is not renewable. 
The second variation includes renewable vegetable crops('veggie') in the 
landscape. Once a veggie is eaten, it will only regrow according to 
its height at a slow growth or fast growth rate. 
HOW TO USE THE PARAMETERS 
1. Set the veggie? switch to TRUE to include veggie in the model, or to 
FALSE to only include type 1 and type 0 species. 
2. Set the growth? switch for the veggie resources to TRUE to allow veggie 
to regrow, or to FALSE to only fixed number to the initial amount. 
3. Set the honey? switch to TRUE to include honey in the model, or to 
FALSE to only include type 1 and type 0 species. 
4. Adjust the slider parameters (see below), or use the default settings. 
5. Press the SETUP button. 
6. Press the GO button to begin the simulation. 
7. Look at the monitors to see the current population sizes and best 
fitness genes and its fitness level. 
8. Look at the POPULATIONS plot to watch the populations fluctuate over 
time. 
9. Export survivors' information to data files. 
Resources Parameters: 
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max-veggie-height: The maximum height level of veggie 
slow-growth-rate: The veggie slowly grows at this percentage 
height-threshold: The veggie's threshold for growth rate: below the 
threshold, it grows slowly; above the threshold, it grows fast. 
fast-growth-rate: The veggie grows rapidly at this percentage 
honey-reward: The amount of energy reward each individual gets for every 
honey resource taken 
honey-percentage: The amount of resources located in that environment 
Population Parameters: 
population-size: The initial size of population 
crossover-rate: The crossover incidence in each chromosome pairing 
mutation-rate: The probability of chromosome bits mutating 
MIN-LIFESPAN: Minimum life span of an individual 
max-population: Maximum population allowed in environment 
energy-gain-from-food: The amount of energy individual gets for every 
resource consumed 
move-enerygy-consumption: The amount of energy each agent consumes to make 
a move 
reproduction-threshold: The threshold of an agent's energy required for 
reproducing at each time step 
show-age?: Whether to show the age of each agent as a number 
show-energy?: Whether to show the energy of each agent as a number 
Example run: 
1. Open 'ALGAE', the interface is given as: 
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Figure C.1: ALGAE interface 
2. Adjust parameter settings. Click 'SETUP' button, ALGAE presents an initial 
setup accordingly. 
3. Click 'RUN' button, ALGAE runs a number of generations and present the 
final stage when it reaches stopping criteria. 
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Figure C.2: ALGAE setup 
Figure C.3: ALGAE output 
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Appendix D 
ALGAE Source Code 
breed [turts turt] 
breed [honeys honey] 
turtles-own [ 
bits fitness energy age wealth 
preference life-span vision-radius move-angle action-speed motion-loss 
action-choice attack-ability attack-loss food-efficiency 
patches-own [vegie value] 
globals [ 
winner 
generation 
to setup 
clear-all 
turtle that currently has the best solution 
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setup-common-variables 
if vegie? [ 
ask patches 
set vegie max-vegie-height 
color-vegie 
set value random 20 
if honey? [ 
draw-g:tid 
distribute-honey 
setup-turts 
display-labels 
reset-ticks 
end 
to setup-common-variables 
set generation 0 
ask turtles [ 
end 
set energy 70 + random 30 
set age 1 
set wealth 0 
setxy random-xcor random-ycor 
1' 
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to setup-turts 
set-default-shape turtles "person" 
;create-turts population-size [ 
ask patches [ 
if count turts < population-size 
sprout-turts 1 
set size 2 easier to see 
set bits n-values 18 [one-of [O 1]] 
if else count turts <= population-size I 2 
(rand.om-float 1.0 <=cooperative-probability 
set bits fput 0 bits set color red set preference 0 ] 
set bits fput 1 bits set color blue set preference 1 ] 
decode-turt-genes 
calculate-fitness 
update-best-turt 
save-file-var best-fitness-decode-filename 
save-file-var survivors-decode-filename 
end 
to save-file-var [ filename 
file-open filename 
file-write (word "[preference, life-span, vision-radius, move-angle, 
action-speed, motion-loss, food-pref, inter-pref, attack-ability, 
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attack-loss, food-efficiency] 11 );, fitness]") 
end 
to draw-grid 
ask patches 
end 
set pcolor blue + 4 
sprout 1 [ 
set shape 11 square 11 
set color cyan + 2 
stamp 
die 
to distribute-honey 
set-default-shape honeys 11 leaf 11 
ask patches with [ random 100 < honey-percentage ] [ 
sprout-honeys 1 [ set size 1 set color orange + 1 ] 
end 
to save-winner-decode-file 
file-open best-fitness-decode-filename 
if winner != nobody ; ; [ output-print ( word [bits] of wi.nner 11 \n" ) J;; 
file,..·write ( word [bits] of winner 11 \n" ) 
ask winner [ 
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f I 
decode 11 action--choice 11 into two parts: food-pref & interaction 
preference 
let action-queue but-first action-choice 
let food-pref ( first action-queue 
let list-2-bi ts [ [O OJ [O 1J [1 OJ [1 1J J 
let inter-pref ( 1 + position action-queue list-2-bits ) 
file-write (word 11 [ 11 preference 11 , 11 (life-span - MIN-LIFESPAN) 
vision-radius II II 
' 
(move-angle I 90) 11 , 11 action-speed 11 , 11 
motion-loss 11 11 food-pref 11 ," inter-pref 11 , 11 attack-ability 
II II 
' 
II II 
' 
attack-loss II II 
' 
food-efficiency 11 ] 11 ); II II 
' 
floor (fitness) 11 ] 11 ) 
end 
to save-survivors-decode-file 
file-open survivors-decode-filename ;"genedecode.txt 11 
ask turts 
decode '' action-choice 11 into two parts: food-pref & interaction 
preference 
let action-queue but-first action-choice 
let food-pref ( first action-queue 
let list-2-bi ts [ [O OJ [O 1J [1 OJ [1 1J J 
let inter-pref ( 1 + position action-queue list-2-bits ) 
file-write (word 11 [ 11 preference 11 , 11 (life-span - MIN-LIFESPAN) 
vision-radius II II 
' 
(move-angle I 90) "," action-speed 11 , 11 
motion-loss 11 "food-pref 11 , 11 inter-pref 
attack-loss II II 
' 
food-efficiency 11 ] 11 ) 
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II II 
' 
attack-ability 
11 II 
, 
II II 
' 
end 
to save-survivors-gene-file 
file-open survivors-gene-filename ;; 11 gene.txt 11 
ask turts [ file-write ( word bits ) ] 
end 
to go 
ifelse (not any? turtles) or (count turts with [preference = 1] 0 ) or 
(count turts with [preference = O] = 0 ) or ( generation >= 
max-n"-generation );; or (honey? and. not any? honeys) or ( vegie? 
and not any? patches with [vegie > 1] ) ;; if vegie is on, check 
vegie on patch 
save-wipner-decode-f ile 
save-survivors-gene-file 
save-survivors-decode-file 
file-close-all 
stop 
save-winner-decode-file 
save-survivors-gene-file 
save-survivors-decode-file 
file-close-all 
if vegie? [ 
ask patches 
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1 I 
if grow? [ grow-vegie 
color-vegie 
turts-act 
display-labels 
tick 
end 
to turts-act 
ask turts [ 
turt-act 
calculate-fitness 
;create-next-generation 
set generation generation + 1 
update-best-turt 
end 
to update-best-turt 
without Tournament 
set winner max-one-of turts [fitness] 
end 
to grow-vegie 
if else ( vegie >= height-threshold ) 
if fast-growth-rate >= random-float 100 
[set vegie·vegie + 1] 
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I, 
] 
[ if slow-growth-rate >= random-float 100 
[ set vegie vegie + 1 ] 
if vegie > max-vegie-height 
[ set vegie max-vegie-height 
end 
according to vegie height level, turn the patch green color in scale of 
hue 
to color-vegie 
set pcolor scale-color (green - 1) vegie 0 (2 * max-vegie-height) 
end 
to move ;; turtle procedure 
rt random 360 
f d 1 
set age age + 1 
set energy energy - move-energy-consumption 
if energy < 0 [ die ] 
end 
turts eat vegie, change vegie height and turn the patch brown hue; 
to eat-vegie-pref erence [ selfish ] 
if else preference = 1 
if vegie > 0 [ 
set vegie vegie - 1 
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set energy energy + energy-gain-from-food * food-efficiency 
energy through eating, [1*energy--gain·-·frorn·-·food, 
4~energy-gain-from-f ood] 
set wealth wealth + value 
set .value 0 
if vegie > height-threshold 
set vegie vegie - 1 
set energy energy + energy-gain-from-food * food-efficiency 
energy through eating, [1*energy-gain-from-f ood, 
4*energy-gain-f rom-f ood] 
set wealth wealth + value 
set value 0 
gain 
gain 
if energy >~ max-energy [ set energy max-energy ] 
energy 
, , maximum 
end 
to fight [ prey 
let win 0 
ask prey 
;show (word "prey energy (before):" energy) 
set energy energy - max list 10 random energy 
minimum 10 or more if ra..ridorn energy is more 
;show (word "prey energy (after): 11 energy) 
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prey loses energy 
l I 
if energy <= 0 [ set win 1 die ] 
;show (word "predator energy (before):" energy 
let loss min list 10 random energy predator loses energy 
of maximum 10 or less (if random energy is less than 10) 
if else win = 1 ; ; kill it 
set energy energy+ energy-gain-from-prey - loss] ;; get energy from 
prey, and. lose energy fi.ghting 
set energy energy - loss] ;; get no energy from prey, and lose 
energy fighting 
if energy >= max-energy [ set energy max-energy ] 
;show (word "predator energy (after):" energy) 
end 
maximum energy 
to attack [ prey ] 
stronger wins; 
calculate attack strength for self and prey, and the 
let strength-prey 0 
let strength-self energy + attack-ability * random-float 1 * 20 I 4 
; ; self strength 
ask prey [ set strength-prey energy + attack-ability * random-float 1 * 
20 I 4] ;; prey stength 
the stronger wins 
if else strength-self >= strength-prey [ 
set energy energy - attack-loss * random-float 1 death-check 
ask prey [ set energy energy - attack-loss * random-float 1 - 40 
death-check ] 
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[ set energy energy - attack-loss * random-float 1 - 40 death-check 
ask prey [ set energy energy - attack-loss * random-float 1 death-check 
end 
to calculate-fitness 
set fitness energy 
end 
turts procedure 
to death-check energy change, need to update fitness and turt.surv.ior 
status 
if energy <= 0 [ die 
calculate-fitness 
end 
to decode-turt-genes 
let list-2-bi ts [ [O OJ [O 1J [1 OJ [1 1J J 
let list-3-bi ts [ [O 0 OJ [O 0 1J [O 1 OJ [O 1 1J [1 0 OJ [1 0 1J [1 1 OJ 
[1 1 1J J 
set preference first bits 
1 bit - take item 0: first bit to describe agent's preference 1: 
selfish blue 0: a1truisti.c pink 
set life~span ( MIN-LIFESPAN + position ( sublist bits 1 3 list-2-bits 
) ; ; 2 bit - take the gene from i tern 1 - 4 ; ; obtain max life span, 
set as span; minimum··-lifespan is 50 
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set vision-radius ( 1 + position ( sublist bits 3 5 ) list-2-bits ) 
2 bit ·- take the gene from item 5 -· 6 ; ; obtain vision field size, 
set as radius; mirunum radius is 1 
set move-angle 90 * ( 1 + position ( sublist bits 5 7 ) list-2-bits 
'' 
2 bit - take the gene from item 7 - 8 ;; obtain move direction 
degrees, set as angle [90 180 270 360]; move direction refers to 360 
degrees coverage 
set action-speed ( 1 + position ( sublist bits 7 9 ) list-2-bits ) ; ; 2 
bit - take the gene from item 9 - 10 ; ; obtain move action-· speed, set 
as each move stepsize 1-4; 
set motion-loss ( 1 + item 9 bits 1 
bit - take the gene from item 11 ,, obtain energy motion-loss: 1-2 
set action-choice sublist bits 10 13 ; ; 3 
bit - take the gene from item 12 - 14 ;; obtain action preferece: 0-7 
1st bit: O:eat-food first 1:eat-food later 1:mate 2: fight 00: 1 I 
01: 2 I 10: 12 I 11: 21 
set attack-ability ( 1 + position ( sublist bits 13 15 ) list-2-bits ) 
;; 2 bit - take the gene from item 15 - 18 ;; obtain attack ability: 
1-16 
set attack-loss ( 1 +position (sublist bits 15 17) list-2-bits) ;; 2 
bit - take the gene from item 19 - 21 ;; obtain attack loss: 1-8 
set food-efficiency ( 1 + position ( sublist bits 17 19 ) list-2-bits 
end 
; ; 2 bit -- take the gene from item 22 -· 23 ; ; obtain food aborbing 
eff.iciency: 1-4 
to action-with-mate 
let action-queue but-first action-choice 
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if else first action-queue = 0 
if else last action-queue = 1 
let prey look-for-prey if prey !=nobody [ attack prey] ] 01: 
fight ;; attack prey 
if count turts < max-population - 1 and energy >= 
reproduction-threshold;; 00: mate 
let mate look-for-mate 
if mate != nobody and [energy] of mate >= reproduction-threshold 
reproduce-crossover-turt mate ] 
;; look for the best mate to reproduce 
if else last action-queue 1 
; ; 11: fight mate 
[ let prey look-for-prey if prey != nobody [ attack prey ] 
] 
[ 
; ; atta.ck prey 
if count turts < max-population - 1 and energy >= 
reproduction-threshold ; ; look for the best mate to reproduce 
let mate look-for-mate 
if mate != nobody and [energy] of mate >= reproduction-threshold 
reproduce-crossover-turt mate ] 
;; 10: mate fight 
if count turts < max-population - 1 and energy >= 
reproduction-threshold;; look for the best mate to reproduce 
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[ let mate look-for-mate 
if mate != nobody and [energy] of mate >= reproduction-threshold 
reproduce-crossover-turt mate ] 
let prey look-for-prey if prey != nobody [ attack prey ] 
; ; attack prey 
end 
to turt-act 
ifelse first action-choice= 0 ;; eat food first 
fetch-food action-with-mate 
action-with-mate fetch-food 
rt random move-angle 
f d action-speed 
set energy energy - motion-loss 
death-check 
set age age + 1 
if age >= life-span [ die ] 
end 
to-report look-for-honey 
let h one-of honeys in-cone vision-radius move-angle 
report h 
end 
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to fetch-honey [ h ] 
face h 
move-to h 
set energy energy+ honey-reward* food-efficiency;; energy gain from 
honey, when honey-re1tJard is 4, 4 - 16, [l*honey-reward, 
4*honey-reward] 
ask h [ set color gray stamp die ] 
if energy >= max-energy [ set energy max-energy ] ma.ximum 
energy 
end 
to-report look-for-food-target 
let p max-one-of patches in-cone vision-radius move-angle [ vegie 
;show ( word "pat.ch here: vegie 11 patch-here vegie ) ;show ( word 11 p: 
vegie" p [vegie] of p) 
ifelse p != nobody 
report p ] 
report patch-here 
end 
to-report look-for-mate 
let mate max-one-of other breed in-cone vision-radius move-angle [ 
fitness] ;;vision-radius vision-angle; [let p max-one-of neighbors 
[patch-variable] 
report mate 
end 
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to-report look-for-prey 
let prey min-one-of other breed in-cone vision-radius move-angle [ 
fitness] ;;vision-radius vision-angle ; [let p max-one-of neighbors 
[patch-variable] 
report prey 
end 
to fetch-food 
if honey? ,, if honey is resources, 
fetch honey 
if else any? honeys-here 
let hone-of honeys-here fetch-honey h] ;; preference 
food-efficiency J ;; show h 
here 
let h look-for-honey 
here: I honey " patch-here h. ) 
area 
if h != nobody [ fetch-honey h ] 
go and get it 
show "honey here 11 J ; , pick up can 
output-print ( woTd. "patch 
look for an.y can in the vision 
found honey in vision area, 
[ rt rand.om move-angle f d action-speed. 
the area, move randomly 
nothing found in 
set energy energy - motion-loss 
death-check 
if vegie? [ if vegie is resources, 
take vegie ; show ( word 11 patch here: 11 patch-··here) 
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end 
let target-patch look-for-food-target 
patch and eat by preference 
move-to target-patch 
here: 11 patch-here) 
eat-vegie-pref erence 
to reproduce-crossover-turt [ mate ] 
let parent1 self 
let parent2 mate 
move to the best vegie 
show ( word 0 new patch 
let child-bits crossover ([bits] of parent1) ([bits] of parent2) 
; create the two children, with their new genetic material 
ask parent 1 [ 
set energy ( 0.5 * energy ) 
calculate-fitness 
hatch 1 [ set bits item 0 child-bits 
mutate 
rt random-float 360 f d 1 
set age 1 
later for selfish and altruistic 
decode-turt-genes 
if else preference 0 
set color red ] 
set color blue ] 
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set up offspring's initial level 
set up wealth distribution level 
l I 
ask parent2 [ 
end 
set energy ( 0.5 * energy ) 
calculate-fitness 
hatch 1 [ set bits item 1 child-bits 
mutate 
rt random-float 360 fd 1 set up offspring>s initial 1.eve1 
set age 1 set up wealth distribution level 
later for selfish and altruistic 
decode-turt-genes 
if else preference 0 
set color red ] 
[ set color blue ] 
J 
to-report crossover [bits1 bits2] 
let split-point 1 + random (length bits1 - 1) 
report list (sentence (sublist bits! 0 split-point) 
end 
(sublist bits2 split-point length bits2)) 
(sentence (sublist bits2 0 split-point) 
(sublist bits1 split-point length bits1)) 
This procedure causes random mutations to occur in a solution's bits. 
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The probability that each bit will be flipped is controlled by the 
MUTATION-RATE slider. 
to mutate turtle procedure 
let p first bits 
; ; show (word "bits:" bits ) 
let temp-bits map [ifelse-value (random-float 100.0 < mutation-rate) [1 
- ?] [?] J 
but-first bits 
set bits fput p temp-bits 
show ( word 11 mutate bits:" bits) 
end 
to display-labels 
ask turts [ 
end 
if else show-info? 
if show-energy? [ set label-color black set label round energy ] 
if show-age? [ set label age ] 
set label 1111 ] 
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